

In a resolution adopted December 17, 1952, the North Atlantic Council expressed its wholehearted admiration for these efforts and acknowledged that the resistance of the free nations of Southeast Asia was in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic community, and agreed that the campaign waged by French Union forces in Indo-China merited support from NATO members. Indeed there is a close strategic relationship not only between events in Korea and Indo-China, but also between events in Indo-China and in Western Europe, because events in Indo-China have a very important bearing on France's contribution to the defence of Western Europe. . . .

In this tour I have reached Southeast Asia, and it is interesting to note that there is now only a relatively small geographical gap between Southeast Asia and the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, which goes to the Eastern boundaries of Turkey. And so in a debate of this kind, it is possibly not as inappropriate as it might seem to jump from Southeast Asia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

. . . All members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and all members of the Commonwealth, I think except Asian members, have recognized Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

So far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is concerned, the feeling has recently developed that the high hopes which we placed in NATO not so long ago are not being realized. The claim is being put forward on the one hand that NATO defence plans are inadequate and are being implemented too slowly to meet the threat which Soviet military strength still poses in Europe. On the other hand, some people feel that the effort to achieve the military targets agreed to at Lisbon is resulting in economic weakness and social and political division, and that economic and political co-operation is being subordinated to excessive military planning.

Well, I think myself that both these criticisms are somewhat exaggerated. If NATO has lost some of the momentum of its earliest days and some of the appeal of those days -- and I am not denying that that might be the case -- it is due, I suggest, to a certain recent tendency, which is a natural one in the circumstances to mark time during the longish period while the leader of the coalition was changing the guard, and the period between the changing and the mounting of that guard. There was a certain hesitation in NATO activity which extended over some months.

It might also be due to a feeling of lessening tension as the years go by without attack, and with growing strength on our side which, of course, means heavy defence burdens. That feeling can be dangerous by lulling us into a sense of false security and, indeed, complacency. On the other hand I suggest that it should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the founding and building up of this NATO coalition of 14 nations is itself, one of the greatest achievements of history in our time. People already tend to take for granted this really revolutionary development which has taken place in less than four years. And so it should be a source of sober satisfaction, though certainly not of complacency, that by the end of 1952 in Western Europe, largely because of NATO, the temptation to easy and victorious aggression has been removed, that temptation which is the greatest threat to peace when totalitarian governments are around.

Canada's contribution to NATO forces remains in accordance with the commitments which we accepted at Lisbon. They include 24 warships being made available by the Royal Canadian Navy for anti-submarine and coastal service as part of the Atlantic