

Should India and Pakistan refuse to accept the Treaty unconditionally, Canada should nevertheless encourage the international community to ensure the Treaty's legal entry into force.

Response

The conclusion of the CTBT had been a goal of successive Canadian Governments. Ratification of the CTBT in December 1998 afforded Canada the requisite standing to advocate on the Treaty's behalf. With over 150 states as signatories, including the five nuclear-weapon States, the CTBT represents a formidable international consensus against nuclear test explosions in all environments. Due to a stringent entry into force provision, stipulating that the Treaty cannot enter into force until ratified by all of the 44 countries with nuclear reactors named in an annex, negotiators accepted a Canadian proposal for the convening of annual conferences, should the CTBT not enter into force three years after its opening for signature (Article XIV.2 of the Treaty) in 1996.

The first such "Article XIV Conference" is anticipated for the fall of 1999. The purpose of this conference would be to examine the extent to which the requirement for entry into force had been met and to consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process. Canada has provided CTBT signatory States with two working papers intended to stimulate discussion. We are lending practical support to states may face obstacles in making the necessary domestic arrangements for implementation. (For example, we have provided as a model for other states Canada's bilateral agreement with the CTBT Organization for the implementation of the International Monitoring System.) The success of an Article XIV Conference will reinforce to the continued viability of the CTBT.



Canada should play a strong role at the Conference on Disarmament in the forthcoming negotiations for a broad Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which will serve both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

Response

Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian Governments have been directly and actively committed to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In 1994, Canada's then Ambassador for Disarmament, Gerald Shannon, was appointed Special Coordinator in the CD and tasked with achieving consensus for a negotiating mandate for an FMCT. In 1995, the "Shannon Report" was adopted by the CD and endorsed in the "Principles and Objectives" decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In August 1998, the CD agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate