

of Chinese foreign policy that seeks to realize maximum security benefits while minimizing moral and normative costs. This would explain the meshing of principled stand (*jiben luxian*) with practical adaptations under certain circumstances.⁶⁵ Yet a third way to understand Chinese multilateralism is what can be called the rhetorical and substantive of Chinese foreign policy. This leads to a combination of rigidity and flexibility in Chinese international behaviors. As long as fundamental national interests can be secured, Beijing has been willing to be more flexible with regard to how certain issues should be handled.⁶⁶

On a number of arms control and disarmament issues of particular Canadian concerns, such as the anti-personnel landmines, light weapons, and general nuclear disarmament involving all five nuclear weapons states, China has not accepted Canada's sweeping recommendation of total bans out of its security considerations; nor is it keen to participate in nuclear disarmament before the US and Russia have substantially cut back on their arsenals. Regarding the negotiation toward a fissile materials cut-off treaty, China may be less interested than Canada in pushing it on the CD agenda, especially after the passage in US Congress of legislation on national missile defense and increasing controversy over the theatre missile defense in Northeast Asia despite Beijing's strong opposition. On peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Beijing is opposed to the idea of expanding beyond the traditional UN mandates and especially concerned over the concept of humanitarian intervention and involvement in intrastate conflicts.⁶⁷ Contrary to the Canadian call for the UN to expand its PKOs to deal with intrastate conflicts in order to protect population and human security and post-conflict involvement in peacebuilding, China is more cautious and indeed has had serious reservations about some of the recent developments in UN peacekeeping activities. Prominent among them are the changed nature of the missions from an originally strictly third party intervention to mediate and supervise cease-fires and peace with impartiality and non-violence, to an expanded yet not well defined one of performing a host of tasks. Aside from the financial burdens, the more serious and long-term consequence lies in the deviation from the traditional principles and norms that made UNPKOs both manageable and successful endeavors. The lack of consultation in the process, with Western powers basically setting the agenda, the increasing use of force and involvement in intrastate as opposed to interstate conflicts, interference in member states' internal affairs, and the failure to withhold neutrality in implementation are effectively eroding the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping operations even as they challenge state sovereignty. As China sees it, unless UNPKOs follow certain norms and principles and return to their right track, there is the grave consequence that they may become nothing more than an instrument for power politics, using the UN as authorization and justification.

⁶⁵ Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World in the Changing World Order," in Kim, ed., *China and the World*, pp.128-68.

⁶⁶ Quansheng Zhao, "Patterns and Choices of Chinese Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs* 20:1 (Spring 1993), pp.3-15.

⁶⁷ Jing-dong Yuan, "Multilateral Intervention and State Sovereignty: Chinese Views on UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Political Science* 49:2 (January 1998), pp.275-95.