

substantial (and in some instances growing) responsibilities in security in the OSCE space.<sup>43</sup> In addition, given the multi-dimensionality of the broadened agenda, it would make sense to include other OSCE institutions (e.g. ODIHR and the HCNM) more systematically in such a process. These could take the form of regular consultation on ongoing cooperation, but this could fruitfully be supplemented by less frequent and more general treatment of such issues as optimal distribution of labour in peace-building, and lessons learned from existing and past cooperative operations, perhaps in a seminar format.

In addition, there has been consideration that the FSC might be a useful forum for the elaboration of CSBMs operating at the sub-regional level. Several sub-regions (the southern Caucasus, the Black Sea,<sup>44</sup> the Caspian Basin and Central Asia) seem particularly appropriate in this regard. The advantage of a broader forum is that the tensions within the smaller subgroup of directly affected states would be diluted within the larger framework while the latter would be a potentially effective way of applying constructive leverage on reluctant parties.

It is **also** worth noting, with reference to Canada, that such a broadening of the activities of the FSC might make it a very useful platform for the promotion of certain prominent aspects of Canadian policy in the area of international security, among them the land mines treaty, small arms control, child soldiers, and, at a broader level, human security as an organizing concept for thinking about security issues.

The viability of this option depends to a considerable extent on finding modalities for discussing these issues constructively in a non-threatening environment. With regard to new security issues such as internal conflict, given the sensitivity of these questions and the intensity of the interests at stake, it is unlikely that they could be addressed immediately (if ever) in formal working groups or in the FSC itself. It may be possible, however, to situate them in less formal settings such as seminars involving not only member states and OSCE officials, but also academic experts and civil society stake-holders, and convened under the auspices of Working Group B (which is to address future challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE region and develop goals and methods for building, maintaining and improving security).<sup>45</sup> It is possible that these seminars could be contracted out to organizations with active research programmes focusing on the OSCE (e.g. the *Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik* at the University of Hamburg), on particular issues (e.g. the Conflict Prevention Network of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*), or on particularly troubling sub-regions (e.g. the Former Soviet South Project at the Royal Institute for International Affairs). To the extent that discussion of new security issues were distanced from the

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<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that there is reasonably regular consultation between the UN and the OSCE and between NATO and the OSCE, but this tends to focus on specific implementation tasks in joint operations, rather than on broader conceptual and analytical issues. Interviews in Brussels, March 2000.

<sup>44</sup> *Viz.* the recent discussion of CSBMs relating to naval activities in the Black Sea region.

<sup>45</sup> In 2000, the FSC decided to maintain three subsidiary bodies: Working Group A (implementation), Working Group B (as above), and Working Group C (communications network). FSC JOUR/281).