

lem must be influenced by the attitude of the Assembly towards the other problem. Failure to agree on a middle course of this type would mean perhaps, indeed probably, failure to agree on any course. That would mean deadlock and the return not only to the unhappy conditions but to conditions that might be even worse and even more dangerous to international peace and security. It would have also consequences for this organization which might be far reaching. I know that you will agree that it is our responsibility to avoid this disastrous result, which surely no one wants.

"The Secretary-General's report which we have before us, and which we have been considering, shows the way out of this deadlock. He has given his views, sane and reasonable, I think, on the steps which should be taken after withdrawal but which perhaps we can approve now. These steps must be taken within the limits fixed by previous resolutions and decisions of the United Nations which until we alter them remain in effect. His report emphasizes, rightly I think, that action through the recommendations of this Assembly should be contrasted with decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter; Assembly recommendations require for their implementation the consent of the parties concerned.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

"The main argument of the Secretary-General's report is that we must return to useful implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, but that this should be joined with United Nations action to secure and supervise such implementation, something which has been absent in recent years. This requires that we take action for ensuring implementation. The mere injunction on the parties concerned to observe the Armistice Agreement in its entirety may not prove to be very effective. The Secretary-General said on page 5 of his report:

"...There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs, of which this deterioration formed part, should not be permitted to return. Renewed full implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement obviously presumes such an attitude on the part of the governments concerned, and such supporting measure as would guarantee a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to lack of compliance with the Agreement, had progressively deteriorated."

"Compliance with the Armistice Agreement is in our view as important as compliance with the recent resolutions on withdrawal and with other types of resolutions we have adopted, though any effort to bring about that larger compliance, I repeat, should be consequent to our decision on withdrawal. But that compliance, I repeat, should be in accordance with

all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, Article I as well as Articles VI, VII, and VIII. Such full implementation, supervised and secured by the United Nations, would, the Secretary-General tells us, have an important and positive bearing on other problems in the region, and I certainly agree with that.

"Therefore, Mr. President, I venture to suggest that we might consider proceeding as follows. First, the withdrawal of Israeli forces should be discussed and decided; then immediately we should discuss and decide on a resolution which would include as its basic principle that the withdrawal of Israeli forces must be followed immediately by action which would represent real progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the region, action which in our view, is necessary to accomplish that essential result.

MR. PEARSON'S SUGGESTIONS

I suggest, Mr. President, for consideration by the Assembly that certain ideas might be worthy of inclusion in any resolution which we may be discussing. I think that the two parties concerned, Egypt and Israel, should be called upon by this Assembly to observe all the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights. I think that the Secretary-General might be instructed to make arrangements, after consultation with the parties concerned, for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the demarcation line and in the Gaza strip, in order that this Force, which is our own creation and which is effectively functioning in the area in the interests of peace and security, might assume the supervisory duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; prevent incursions and raids across the demarcation line and maintain peaceful conditions along the line. I believe that Egypt and Israel, to assist in this essential work of the United Nations Emergency Force, should be requested to remove from or limit their military forces in these areas of deployment which would be defined. I think that the United Nations should be associated with steps to replace the present civilian administration of the Gaza strip and to ensure that that area will not in the future be used as a base or as a target for raids or retaliations. I believe that it would be wise to take appropriate steps to determine legal positions in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran but that pending this determination the parties should be called upon to give assurances that they will not assert or exercise any belligerent rights in these waters or interfere with navigation in them. And then I think that the Secretary-General, on whom we seem to be placing great burdens of responsibility these days, should be authorized to arrange for a unit or units of the United