The afternoon was devoted to a presentation by Mr. Ron Cleminson and an extended discussion. The latter sought to develop general themes and conclusions and also included a discussion of the Deibert, Bedeski, and Macintosh papers.

Mr. Cleminson's presentation, "On-site Monitoring Experience to Date: A Case Study for Verification of Future Compliance," focused on the role that cooperative aerial and space surveillance might play in the future. The presentation first examined the background of the multilateral use of overhead imagery, stressing the increasingly important role that multilateralism played in arms control and the importance assigned to it by Canada. The most compelling contemporary illustrations of multilateral monitoring efforts were seen in the Stockholm/Vienna CCSBMDE process, the Open Skies Treaty, and UNSCOM (in Iraq).

A central element in Mr. Cleminson's presentation was the inevitable globalization of the arms control process. Verification, confidence building, peacekeeping, and transparency were going to become even more important elements in the pursuit of international stability. It was quite clear in looking at the way monitoring efforts had expanded over recent years that overhead imagery was playing an increasingly important role. Canadian research efforts had highlighted a variety of possibilities, including PAXSAT B with its synthetic aperture radar for monitoring ground force deployments; a DASH "Open Skies"-type aircraft; and a mini-dirigible containing a video and electronic camera for expanding the view of on-site inspectors. The Stockholm Agreement had codified the use of overhead inspection and the Open Skies Treaty carried the concept of aerial observation much further.

However, Mr. Cleminson argued that UNSCOM and UN Security Council Resolution 687 provided the richest example of overhead monitoring synergies. While the overall effort of UNSCOM should not be confused with traditional arms control, the use of NTM and commercial satellites, high- and low-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, terrestrial inspectors and sensors, and collateral means (including defector reports) suggested how comprehensive and effective a multi-layered system of monitoring could be.

Mr. Cleminson concluded his presentation by noting three basic verification models that might be employed in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty case. Verification capabilities could be developed in a new, "stand alone" entity; they could be developed in association with (but distinct from) an existing organization; or they could be developed within an existing entity. In each case, advantages and disadvantages needed to be weighed against each other. The freedom of a unique and independent organization also meant that there was no infrastructure or experience to guide its efforts. Alternative-