

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In introducing the report of the Committee, I would like to briefly take stock of where we stand on the major substantive elements of the draft convention.

As regards article I, on Scope, only one aspect was addressed during this session, namely the question of "jurisdiction or control", i.e. the legal scope of the convention. From the discussions it appears that the problems are both of a political and a legal nature, and I find it important that delegations now bring this issue back to their capitals for thorough legal and political analysis.

Article II covers definitions. There has been an understanding in the Committee that this article would best be reviewed after agreements have been registered in other parts of the convention, not the least in the context of article VI. I believe that we now have a broad understanding on most of the relevant substantive provisions of the draft convention, and that the time has come to elaborate the definitions of the convention. Therefore I strongly urge all delegations to thoroughly study this article, so that during the inter-sessional work later this year we can bring it up to date and into line with the developments which have taken place since it was first put together.

Article III on declarations, and its annex, are by and large in place. An outstanding issue has been the question of declarations of past transfers. A step forward was taken this summer when we were able to achieve agreement that past transfers of chemical weapons should be declared. It however remains to decide how many years back in time such declarations should cover.

Article IV and its annex deal with measures to be taken as regards existing chemical weapons. In this area much progress was achieved this year. During the spring we were finally able to solve the long-standing difficulties connected with the issue of destruction versus diversion of existing chemical weapons. The draft convention we now have before us clearly stipulates that all chemical weapons must be destroyed. Furthermore, this year generated a very important development when it comes to early declarations of the exact location of chemical weapons. We now find ourselves in a situation where only one negotiating party still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention.

With these important steps taken, it was then possible to elaborate very detailed provisions concerning the verification arrangements that will be required to monitor the stockpiles from when they are declared, 30 days after entry into force, up until and including their transport to the destruction facilities. During the summer part of the session some work has also gone into the further elaboration of verification arrangements during the destruction process itself. The work on these latter provisions has not been entirely concluded, but I have good hopes that this can be done during the inter-sessional period.

A major issue under article IV which remains is the question of the actual order of destruction of chemical weapons. This issue, which boils down to fundamental security concerns, was subject to extensive consultations,