

control. This would provide for on-site inspections conducted by international inspectors, both systematic and *ad hoc*, as well as continuous monitoring with specialized on-site instruments. The purpose would be to prevent the clandestine removal of chemical weapons from the declared stocks, and to preclude further chemical weapon production. It is noteworthy that, after years of hesitation, the Soviet Union has finally expressed its readiness to describe the precise locations and to declare the detailed inventory of its chemical weapons upon entry into force of the convention.⁴ Only France is still opposed to an early and complete disclosure of stocks. France claims, on security grounds, the need for each state to preserve for a number of years a certain amount of chemical weapons at undeclared locations.

Elimination of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities would be carried out under international supervision within a 10-year period, beginning not later than 12 months after the convention became effective. Stocks are to be eliminated by destruction. Production facilities would be either destroyed or dismantled, or converted into facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons.

The parties would have the right to produce, or otherwise acquire and use toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention, but these chemicals, as well as the facilities producing them, would be subject to international verification.

Verification of compliance. Since different categories of chemicals would require verification regimes with different degrees of stringency, control lists or 'schedules' have been drawn up for each category.

One such schedule includes chemical compounds which are known as chemical weapons, such as nerve agents, mustard gas, or ingredients of the so-called binary munitions,* and which may be produced only for research or medical purposes and/or protective purposes, and only in very limited quantities and under very strict international control. Another schedule specifies key precursors (that is, chemical substances of importance in the manufacture of chemical weapons), the production, consumption, import and export of which would have to be regularly declared to avoid diversion to prohibited purposes. Each facility producing more than a certain set quantity of key

* That is, munitions filled with two chemicals of relatively low toxicity, which mix and react while the munition is being delivered to the target, the reaction product being a supertoxic agent.

precursors would be subject to routine inspections. Yet another schedule enumerates chemicals which have a weapon potential, but are used on a large scale for legitimate peaceful activities, such as phosgene, chlorine or hydrogen cyanide, and must therefore be subject to some international monitoring. All lists are only preliminary.

The reporting of data, using monitoring equipment and carrying out systematic on-site inspections, would be the common verification measure. Its function would be to confirm that prohibited activities were not taking place and that parties were fulfilling their obligations. Bilateral and multilateral consultation would be envisaged on any matter which might be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the convention.

Inspections on challenge would be resorted to only exceptionally: in those cases when allegations had been made that chemical weapons were being clandestinely stored, produced or otherwise acquired, transferred or used, and when these concerns could not be resolved by routine measures. The procedure would have to be a rapid one to allay suspicions; 48 hours has often been mentioned as a desirable time span from the request to the arrival of inspectors at the site to be inspected. It is understood that the burden of proof of innocence would then be on the accused party. In any case, the on-challenge inspection regime is meant to serve primarily as a deterrent against violations rather than as a method of disclosing them.

Finally, there is broad agreement concerning the required international institutional arrangements: a 'consultative committee', or a 'general conference,' the principal organ of the convention, would have the responsibility for overseeing and reviewing its implementation.

AREAS OF MAJOR DISAGREEMENT

Order of destruction. While it is accepted that the destruction of chemical weapon stocks should start simultaneously for all states possessing such stocks, and that the principle of undiminished national security should be observed throughout the destruction process, there are sharp differences of opinion regarding the actual order of destruction. In 1985, China worked out a special formula for a balanced order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles to prevent any of the parties possessing chemical weapons from gaining a military advantage, but the formula was found by many to be too complicated and was never thoroughly discussed. The Soviet Union proposed that, in view of