

same range of options would not exist as an integrated military structure is needed to ensure that the strategy is credible. While there is no guarantee the right response would be forthcoming, the present integrated command structure offers more assurance than any previous arrangement. Furthermore, Canadian participation insures the Government of some voice in the shaping of the strategy to be followed.

A final function sees NATO as "an agent for co-ordinating the increased volume of East-West contacts and negotiations as the consequence of any emerging détente."³⁸ Any meaningful progress toward a final political settlement in Europe will probably only take place with a gradual reduction in force levels, and over a fairly long period of time. Here NATO has a role to perform since the existing structure allows for meaningful deliberation on such questions.

At the moment the majority of Canadians would probably agree with the traditionalists, but the anti-NATO arguments warrant close consideration, and this is particularly true since NATO has increasingly come under criticism from various elements within Canada. It may be that the more positive aspects, i.e., the last four points, should be stressed to a greater degree by the Government. There is little doubt that the voices being raised against NATO are increasing. (See following section, Chapter IV and Appendix No. 2).

Active Academics and Selected Publics: Some Comparisons.

In looking at the attitudes of the general public it seems safe to generalize that, in all probability, the majority supports Canadian participation in NATO. A CIPO survey in 1960 showed that 59.0% of the sample knew about NATO, and of these 72.3% approved of Canada's participation; and significantly, only 4.0% disapproved.³⁹ In November, 1962 a survey conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute showed that 52% of the national sample thought that the level of Canadian military forces in Europe was 'about right', and another 19.0% were of the opinion that the force level should be increased. Only 10% felt that the troops should be brought back to Canada. (See table No. 5) In the same survey 58% of the national sample stated that the West should increase its overall military strength to meet the threat of communism. (See Table No. 6) Furthermore, in February, 1964 only 17.0% of a CIPO poll expressed the opinion that Canada should maintain her own defences, and 66.8% were willing to support a joint defence pact between the U.S. and Canada.⁴⁰

The above attitudes on the part of the general public, however, do not mean that most Canadians are satisfied with present foreign policy. There is a good deal of ambivalence in overall attitudes since the majority of Canadians would like to see a more independent stand on foreign policy questions. In a survey conducted in October, 1966⁴¹ a majority of the sample (63.0%) stated that Canada does not show enough independence vis-à-vis the U.S. on both domestic and international questions. But to interpret this attitude as comprising a rejection of the policy of interdependence on the part of the general public may be very misleading. It would seem that while accepting the need for alliance commitments there is also a desire for Canada to show greater independence on foreign policy questions. The same attitude pattern was found to exist among the delegates to the annual meeting of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in June, 1967 (See Appendix No. 2). It seems safe to say,