

them till they went to sleep. They wished me to do so."

This active, practical, self-sacrificing love, beaming on the frozen hearts of the children, by degrees melted and animated them. But it was only by degrees. Pestalozzi was at first disappointed. He had expected too much, and had formed no plan of action. He even rather prided himself upon his want of plan.

"I knew," he says, "no system, no method, no art but that which rested on the simple consequences of the firm belief of the children in my love towards them. I wished to know no other."

Before long, however, he began to see that the response which the movement of his heart towards theirs called forth was rather a response to his personal efforts, than one dictated by their own will and conscience. It excited action, but not spontaneous, independent action. This did not satisfy him. He wished to make them act from strictly moral motives.

Gradually, then, Pestalozzi advanced to the main principles of his system of moral education—that virtue, to be worth anything, must be practical; that it must consist not merely in knowing what is right, but in doing it; that even knowing what is right does not come from the exposition of dogmatic precepts, but from the convictions of the conscience; and that therefore both knowing and doing rest ultimately on the enlightenment of the conscience through the exercise of the intellect.

He endeavoured, in the first place, to awaken the moral sense—to make the children conscious of their moral powers, and to accomplish his object, not by preaching to them, though he sometimes did this, but by calling these powers into exercise. He gave them, as he tells us, few explanations. He taught them dogmatically neither morality nor religion. He wished them to be both moral and religious; but he conceived that it was not possible to make them so by verbal precept, by word of command, nor by forcing them to commit to memory formularies which did not represent their own convictions. He did not wish them to say they believed, before they believed. He appealed to what was divine in their hearts, implanted there by the Supreme Creator; and having brought it out into consciousness, called on them to exhibit it in action. "When," he says, "the children were perfectly still, so that you might hear a pin drop, I said to them, 'Don't you feel yourselves more reasonable and more happy now than when you are making a disorderly noise?' When they clung round my neck and called me their father, I would say, 'Children, could you deceive your father? Could you, after embracing me thus, do behind my back what you know I disapprove of? And when we were speaking about the misery of our country, and they felt the happiness of their own lot, I used to say, 'How good God is, to make the heart of man pitiful and compassionate.'" At other times, after telling them of the desolation of some family in the neighbourhood, he would ask them whether they were willing to sacrifice a portion of their own food to feed the starving children of that family?

These instances will suffice to show generally what Pestalozzi meant by moral education, and how he operated on the hearts and consciences of the children. We see that, instead of feeding their sphere, he called on them to exercise those within their reach. He knew what their ordinary family life had been, and he wished to prepare them for something better and nobler; but he felt that this could only be accomplished by making them, while members of *his* family, consciously appreciate what was right, and desire to do it.

Here then, in moral, and, as we shall presently see, in intellectual education, Pestalozzi proceeded from the near, the practical, the actual—to the remote, the abstract,

the ideal. It was on the foundation of what the children were, and could become, in the sphere they occupied, that he built up their moral education.

But he conceived—and, I think, justly—that their intellectual training was to be looked on as part of their moral training. Whatever increases our knowledge of things as they are, leads to the appreciation of truth; for truth, in the widest sense of the term, is this knowledge. But the acquisition of knowledge, as requiring mental effort, and therefore exercising the active powers, necessarily increases the capacity to form judgments on moral questions; so that, in proportion as you cultivate the will, the affections, and the conscience, with a view to independent action, you must cultivate the intellect, which is to impose the proper limits on that independence; and on the other hand, in proportion as you cultivate the intellect, you must train the moral powers which are to carry its decisions into effect. Moral and intellectual education must consequently, in the formation of the human being, proceed together, the one stimulating and maintaining the action of the other. Pestalozzi, therefore, instructed as well as educated; and indeed educated by means of instruction. In carrying out this object, he adopted the general principle I before stated. He proceeded from the near, the practical, the actual, to the remote, the abstract, and the ideal.

We shall see his theoretical views on this point in a few quotations from a work which he wrote some years before, entitled "The Evening Hour of a Hermit." He says:—

"Nature develops all the human faculties by practice, and their growth depends on their exercise."

"The circle of knowledge commences close around a man, and thence extends concentrically."

"Force not the faculties of children into the remote paths of knowledge, until they have gained strength by exercise on things that are near them."

"There is in Nature an order and march of development. If you disturb or interfere with it, you mar the peace and harmony of the mind. And this you do, if, before you have formed the mind by the progressive knowledge of the realities of life, you fling it into the labyrinth of words, and make them the basis of development."

"The artificial march of the ordinary school, anticipating the order of Nature, which proceeds without anxiety and without haste, inverts this order by placing words first, and thus secures a deceitful appearance of success at the expense of natural and safe development."

In these few sentences we recognise all that is most characteristic in the educational principles of Pestalozzi.

I will put them into another form:—

1. There is a natural order in which the powers of the human being develop or unfold themselves.

2. We must study and understand this order of nature, if we would aid, and not disturb, the development.

3. We aid the development, and consequently promote the growth of the faculties concerned in it, when we call them into exercise.

4. Nature exercises the faculties of children on the realities of life—on the near, the present, the actual.

5. If we would promote that exercise of the faculties which constitutes development and ends in growth, we also, as teachers, must, in the case of children, direct them to the realities of life—to the realities of life—to the things which come in contact with them, which concern their immediate interests, feelings, and thoughts.

6. Within this area of personal experience we must confine them, until, by assiduous, practical exercise in it, their powers are strengthened, and they are prepared to advance to the next concentric circle, and then to the next, and so on, in unbroken succession.