

again with a view to strengthening the Commission's presence in the North. When the Commission originally had its headquarters in Hanoi it worked, as it continues to do today, under conditions of the greatest difficulty and with many obstructions and impediments to its free functioning. At the same time, however, there were instances when, through private exchanges and discussions with the DRVN leaders in the North, limited but successful efforts in some fields were made to facilitate the Commission's tasks. If the Commission were more strongly represented in Hanoi than it is at the present time, its opportunities for influence on the Viet Minh leadership, though limited, would be greater than they are at present, and it might act as a more effective deterrent to Northern violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement. We are of course conscious of the equal need, if the Commission's present difficulties are overcome, for obtaining support and facilities from the GRVN for the Commission's continued role in the South.

14. The above suggestions are forwarded in the hope they will be useful in departmental examination of this matter. We did not repeat not think it desirable at this stage to circulate this message to list or regular addressees (although we are marking it for Hooton).

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

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*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3790

Washington, December 15, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 3762 Dec 13.†

Repeat for Information: London, NATO Paris, Paris, Laosdel Geneva (Priority), Saigon (OPImmediate), Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa, DND, CCOS, CGS, DGPO Ottawa from Ottawa.

#### SOUTH VIETNAM – COMMISSION'S ROLE

I had an interesting and I think useful forty-five minutes with Governor Harriman today December 15 to review with him in exploratory fashion the prospects for helpful action by the ICSC in present circumstances in Vietnam.

2. To summarize very briefly Harriman indicated following elements in USA position:

(a) Desire that we press in the Commission for parallel and related consideration of prior allegations against the North and anticipated imminent allegations against the South on the basis of increased USA assistance;

(b) Hope that any Commission response to South Vietnam letter of December [9], 1961 should not repeat not attempt to elicit precise information as to scale and type of increased USA assistance and that the Commission accept response from South Vietnam on general lines, basing alleged Northern violations of CFA under investigation as essential background to South Vietnam exercise of self-defence rights;

(c) As an adjunct to this last, maintenance of present USA (and South Vietnam) intention not repeat not to notify Commission of specific arrivals of men or equipment;

(d) Request that we do everything possible to have Commission accede to requests (shortly to be submitted by South Vietnam) for increased patrolling of important areas;