

Cordier did not admit that a mistake had been made, but I assume that he would not want to say anything which implied criticism of Mr. Lie. He indicated that they would certainly bear in mind our views when taking any future action. I went on to say that there was no lack of appreciation in Ottawa of the serious nature of the situation and understanding of the state of public opinion in the United States. Even though we understood these problems we were anxious that steps should not be taken under pressure which would make cooperation more difficult and fail to take into consideration public opinion in other countries. Cordier said he quite understood our point of view.

2. As I have reported to Mr. Heeney by telephone, your views on the Secretary-General's message are shared by delegates of other countries in New York. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Australian delegation had any advance word of this message. This morning I talked with Nisot of the Belgian delegation who was very upset about it and deplored the fact that it had been sent without consultation. I have not been able to get in touch with Jebb, but I had several talks with Laskey of the United Kingdom. He said that they had had no response from London as yet. He learned several days ago from a member of the United States delegation of the meeting on Monday which Mr. Lie had with Austin, [Arne] Sunde,²⁵ and the Korean Ambassador,²⁶ to which Lie referred at his press conference (see my teletype No. 472 of today's date†). All they had been told, however, was that the meeting considered some of the problems of a unified command, discussed the possibility of United Nations machinery to handle such things as relief supplies, and the offers of non-military assistance, but had come to no conclusion. Neither Laskey nor I has yet been able to find out whether Sunde was involved in the later meeting in which a decision was taken to send a message with reference to ground troops. This meeting, according to what Cordier told me and what I have learned from other sources, began Thursday evening and lasted into Friday morning.

3. When I raised with Laskey the question of whether it was appropriate for the Secretary-General to issue this request for further assistance or whether this ought not to have been left to the Security Council, Laskey said that Hyde of the United States delegation had told him yesterday that the Americans were concerned over the security aspect. They did not want a debate in the Security Council in which the Yugoslavs and others might take part. On these grounds he explained the fact that the Secretary-General had in his letter asked that offers of military assistance be communicated to the Secretary-General "in general terms, leaving detailed arrangements for agreement between Governments and the unified command". The United Nations did not want to be involved in military discussions which should remain secret. Laskey pointed out that although the idea of a United Nations committee had so far been rejected, it appeared that the Secretary-General was constituting a kind of informal committee for his purposes, consisting of representatives of the United States, Korea, the Secretariat, and the present Chairman of the Council.

²⁵ Le président du Conseil de sécurité en juillet 1950.

President of the Security Council for July 1950.

²⁶ John M. Chang