

French abandoned upon their approach. In this situation they continued for some time, unable to form under so hot a fire, and having many gallant officers wounded, who (careless of their persons) had been solely intent upon their duty. I saw the absolute necessity of calling them off, that they might form themselves behind Brigadier Monckton's corps, which was now landed, and drawn up on the beach, in extreme good order.

By this new accident, and this second delay, it was near near night, a sudden storm came on, and the tide began to make; so that I thought it most advisable, not to persevere in so difficult an attack, lest (in case of a repulse) the retreat of Brigadier Townshend's corps might be hazardous and uncertain.

Our artillery had a great effect upon the enemy's left, where the Brigadiers Townshend and Murray were to have attacked; and, it is probable, that if those accidents I have spoken of had not happened, we should have penetrated there, whilst our left and centre (more remote from our artillery) must have borne all the violence of their musquetry.

The French did not attempt to interrupt our march. Some of their savages came down to murder such wounded as could not be brought off, and to scalp the dead, as their custom is.

The place where the attack was intended has these advantages over all others hereabout. Our artillery could be brought into use. The greatest part, or even the whole of the troops, might act at once. And the retreat (in case of a repulse) was secure, at least for a certain time of the tide. Neither one or other of these advantages can any where else be found. The enemy were indeed posted upon a commanding eminence. The beach, upon which the troops were drawn up, was of deep mud, with holes, and cut by several gullies. The hill to be ascended very steep, and not every where practicable. The enemy numerous in their