

NOTES

1. The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada. The author wishes to thank those who have offered observations and suggestions during the drafting of this paper, particularly those from the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

2. For further discussion of compliance monitoring and evaluating approaches to the CCW, see Andrew Latham, "Toward An Effective Verification Regime For the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: The Outline of an Incremental Approach," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada), December 1994.

3. It should be noted that there is no compelling technical reason why a package of CCW confidence building measures could not *include* an inspection measure that would satisfy first-generation CCW verification requirements. After all, the Vienna Document, the pre-eminent example of a confidence building agreement, contains a workable if modest inspection measure.

Although this paper does not pursue this particular possibility, it should be kept in mind, particularly if there is a strong sentiment in CCW review discussions against the development of a separate inspection (fact-finding) and verification commission approach to verification.

4. It should be noted that the Chair's rolling text makes mention of what would normally be considered to be confidence building measures in its Article 7 (2 (a) and 2 (c)); Article 8 (1 (c)); and Article 9 (5 (a) and "Proposals Regarding Article 9" (especially 1 and 2)). The relevant portions of these proposed articles generally call for either information exchange or technology (mine location and clearance) exchange/transfer. There is, however, no single article (existing or proposed) that clearly focuses in any collective way on the use of classic confidence building measures (Article 9 comes closest). Instead, reference to CBM-like requirements is fragmentary.

5. The following CBM Arrangement text can fit directly into paragraph 8 (a) of "Possible Verification Arrangement for the CCW Convention" (Annex 1) prepared by Andrew Latham in his companion paper, "Toward an Effective Verification Regime for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: The Outlines of an Incremental Approach." The CBM Arrangement in the current paper is consistent with the general outline in the Latham paper's paragraph 8.

6. The following Non-International Conflict Confidence Building Arrangement text could be added to after paragraph 7 (biii) of Latham's "Possible Verification Arrangement for the CCW Convention" (Annex 1).