

- NIM can provide information for evaluating data exchanges and notifications; in turn, these methods of verification produce information which can serve as a check on the reliability of the sources for NIM.
- The synergistic effects between NIM and OSIs are very high; indeed, information from NIM can be used to trigger OSIs.
- NIM can provide clues about activities warranting closer examination by aerial inspection; aerial surveillance flights can detect suspect activities which can become the focus of NIM.
- NIM can also provide information which can be checked against the measures included under CBMs.

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Constraining proliferation requires analysis of the benefits associated with verification synergies.

- Evaluation of the effectiveness of an arms control verification regime should take into account its verification measures individually and the verification synergies between measures and methods within the regime.
- Bilateral (United States-Former Soviet Union) verification has demonstrated the importance of national technical means (NTM); this argues for more sharing of data from NTM and the development of international technical means (ITM) or multilateral technical means (MTM).
- More cost-effective, simple, "low" verification technologies are needed, for example, development of movement detectors and sensors based on weapons signatures.
- The synergies among aerial surveillance, NTM/ITM/MTM/NIM, and cooperative measures should be exploited.
- A local or regional verification regime involving data exchange and OSIs would have synergies with the countries' NIM and with the NTM/ITM/MTM of other interested countries.

- Potential synergistic effects between arms control implementing bodies should be recognized and utilized; closer cooperation and exchanges of data should be instituted.
- The beneficial synergies from the activities of UNSCOM and IAEA should be considered in future situations requiring compliance with non-proliferation agreements.
- UNSCOM inspections have demonstrated the synergies associated with observations from satellites, aircraft, helicopters, and OSIs.
- In general, the multiplier effects associated with verification synergies need to be identified, analyzed, and taken into account in negotiating non-proliferation and other arms control agreements.
- Cooperation among participating countries in scheduling inspections and in combining the results of monitoring activities produces verification synergies.
- Verification of personnel limitations could be achieved by taking advantage of the verification synergies received when data on the complements of personnel associated with various items of equipment in standard units are combined with judgments formed during OSIs as to whether actual personnel strength matches the same standard.
- The flow of information associated with many arms control activities and verification methods gets impeded when it is compartmented into separate national and bureaucratic agencies. A central multinational agency could collect and analyze data obtained through verification of multilateral arms control agreements. While it might be subject to the dangers of bureaucratic resistance, conflict, and obstruction, such an agency could exploit opportunities for achieving verification synergies.
- With an increased focus on multilateral verification, countries will need to develop cost-benefit analyses in order to evaluate the verification regimes of multilateral

