

the impossible. A similar degree of difficulty would pose the verification in the case of dual purpose agents. With regard to binary weapons in particular, effective control would be practically impossible. Even on site inspection of the entire chemical industry manufacturing pesticides would not prove with any certainty whether or not binary weapons are or can be produced.

It is also a widely held view that a fully effective verification of the destruction of CW stockpiles would require the physical inspection of each and every military warehouse of a State party.

It can, therefore, be concluded that in each of the above mentioned cases the verification process is likely to depend to a large extent on voluntary declarations of States party to a CW convention.

It is consequently believed that whatever verification system is eventually developed and agreed upon in a CW convention, its effectiveness would be enhanced by and largely depend on good will, good faith and mutual understanding of States parties. Such a verification system should in no case give rise to an impression that any provision of a CW convention could legitimately question the recognized principle of international law which says that treaties are implemented in good faith. Indeed, unless there is good faith - no agreement can be trusted.