

the entirety of possible Soviet conduct at Helsinki. Intra-Party discussions of the kind that developed at Genoa, and that were acknowledged to recur in 1970,⁶⁷ will affect the vigour and persistence with which the reform trend is displayed in the months to come. And as was the case with the Genoa policy, Moscow's actions can be expected to depend heavily upon the stability of the Soviet leadership, and on the degree to which Western conduct either validates or undermines the commitment to reform solutions. It may therefore be useful to consider some of the current issues and possible alignments within the Party as it prepares for the opening of the CSCE this summer.

The parallel between decision-making for Genoa and contemporary discussions within the CPSU suggest the broad outlines of debate over the Conference. The existence of a sectarian grouping that favours the CSCE as a forum for anti-imperialist propaganda is suggested by the statements of Soviet military representatives and by certain harsh press commentaries that continue to be made despite Brezhnev's assurances that progress has occurred in discussions with leading Western powers.⁶⁸ This grouping seeks to utilize the formal commitment of the CPSU to anti-imperialism as a means of undermining arguments for comprehensive détente and East-West cooperation, and in order to secure a foreign policy consistent with sectarian attitudes and roles in Soviet