

The requirement for dispersal will require larger numbers of personnel, particularly for the security elements of a peace accord. Rugged countryside will pose barriers to movement and will exhaust both personnel and equipment more quickly than would operations under better conditions. Even equipment representing the latest in high technology will likely suffer from the disadvantages of hilly or mountainous terrain, large-scale movement of humans and animals, and harsh weather especially great heat and sustained heavy rainfall. The fact that sensitive areas tend to be large, far away from cities or even towns, in very rugged country indeed, and where transportation is at a minimum even by Central American standards, cannot be exaggerated in its importance for such an international agency.

Complexity

As has been emphasized throughout this paper, the complexity of verifying the myriad likely objects subject to verification among the provisions of a Central American peace accord could, quite literally, boggle the mind. By far the bulk of these complicating factors are "political," but this explains little because, in any conceivable Central American verification arrangement, virtually everything has a pronounced political dimension.

The especially "political" aspects remain, however, those already mentioned under political verification; that is, the provisions of the Contadora Draft Act, the Esquipulas II accord, or the Sapoá agreement that deal with democratization, national dialogues and reconciliation, amnesties and elections. No previous verification regime has had to deal with these issues in such abundance. In effect, a separate verification effort, largely diplomatic and legal, is required to implement such a regime. Even then, delicate attention would need to be given to its formation and even more delicacy to its functioning.

The sheer breadth of the accords signed or contemplated span a host of major issues and immense problem areas. One has merely to remember, in Esquipulas II for example, the refugee and security provisions, not to mention the political ones just pointed out again. In designing a verification regime, flexibility will have to be built in if it is to address the inevitable growth of responsibilities it will confront as personnel are deployed.

Another enormous problem, but one which is difficult to judge at this stage, is the possible hostility of the United States. The value of super-power assistance in peacekeeping and verification is hard to exaggerate. Such a military power can provide some high-technology assistance, possibly including information from satellites passing over sensitive areas; it can provide sea and air transport facilities for the forces deployed on the ground; it can assist with communications; in short it can simplify greatly the establishment of a verification regime and can provide needed financial support for the endeavour.