of profit costs; but Cotton, L.J., says, "It may happen in some cases that there is a home in but is a bargain between a mortgagee and a mortgagor that certain extra expenses shall be within the shall be within the mortgage security," from which it might perhaps be inferred that in his opinion a contract for profit costs might be made.

COMPANY-MORTGAGE OF UNPAID CALLS.

In re Pyle Works, 44 Chy.D., 534, a company whose articles of association thorized the mortes of association authorized the mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the stock mortgaging of all or any of its assets, and also the unpaid calls on the unpaid calls of the unpaid calls on the unpaid calls on the unpaid calls of the unpaid the stock, mortgaged the unpaid calls. Before the calls were made, the company was ordered to be wound up, and the question then arose whether the mortgages were arose whether the mortgagees were entitled to be paid out of the unpaid calls when collected by the liquidator in priority to the liquidator, in priority to general creditors, and the Court of Appeal (Cotton Lindley and Long Little) Lindley, and Lopes, L.JJ.) held, affirming Stirling, J., that they were; Lopes, L.J. however dubitants of L.J., however, dubitante on the ground that previous decisions appeared to lay down the rule that in a limit is down the rule that in a liquidation all creditors must be paid pari passu, and that this right could not be a life. this right could not be qualified or derogated from by any antecedent contract.

GIFT TO "RELATIVES NAMED" WHO ARE ENTITLED TO A "TRANSMISSIBLE INTEREST" WIFE'S NIECES—ILLEGITIMATE BRIATIVES

In re Jodrell, Jodrell v. Seale, 44 Chy.D., 590, the will of a testator who had an estate of \$1,000,000 left an estate of \$1,000,000, came up for construction. By the will the testator had bequeathed certain legislate. had bequeathed certain legacies to persons whom he described as cousins, and to others as his pieces and after the others as his nieces, and after their deaths to their children—and his residually estate he directed to be a sum of the s estate he directed to be equally divided among such of "his relatives therein to fore named" as hy with the fore named "as hy with the hy with the fore named "as hy with the hy with t fore named," as by virtue of the provisions of the will should become entitled to a vested transmissible interest. a vested transmissible interest in any part of his property. The persons described as the testator's pieces. as the testator's nieces, were his wife's nieces, and not his own; and some of the persons described as according to the persons described as a constant to the persons described as persons described as cousins were illegitimate relatives. Upon this, two or three questions were raised. questions were raised: (1) What was meant by a "transmissible interest", that it include the tenants for 1100 Communications. it include the tenants for life? Stirling, J., held that it did not, and the only those took an interest is only those took an interest in the residue, who took an interest under prior clauses of the will a little prior clauses of the will, which would be transmissible to their representatives to their death. The other assets their death. The other question was (2) Whether the illegitimate relations whom transmissible interests 1. whom transmissible interests had been given were entitled to share in the residue? Stirling. L. decided they were Stirling, J., decided they were not; but on appeal the Court of Appeal (Lord Halsbury, C., and I indian and D.) Halsbury, C., and Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ.) reversed his decision on this point. A point was also made as to make A point was also made as to whether persons who had previously been described as children of persons named. as children of persons named, were themselves to be treated as "before named within the meaning of the will within the meaning of the will, and both Stirling, J., and the Court of Appeal were agreed that they were were agreed that they were.

Vendor and purchaser—Specific performance—Contract by letters—Subsequent $^{\rm NEGOTIA^{c}}$ tions—Withdrawal—Timf.

Bristol, Cardiff & S. Co. v. Maggs, 44 Chy.D., 616, is a case which shows that ough a perfect contract may have though a perfect contract may have been made by letters, for the sale and purchase