think certainly for our grandchildren. Indeed, we should not wonder if, by the time our grandchildren come to college, a new edition of the Song-Book, were required, for we learn that it is confidently expected that *before very long* the first proofs of the projected edition are expected.

In all seriousness, though we know that the Song-Book committee has met with many formidable and unexpected difficulties, we trust that not an hour's unnecessary delay will now occur before the publication of the book.

Finally, it is with unfeigned regret that we take leave of our readers, thanking them for their interest in our journal, and reminding them, that though editorial boards may come and may go, the FORTNIGHTLY looks to them, among others, to enable it to go on prosperously for many years to come. And our last word must be one of most sincere and hearty thanks to the comparatively few, but all the more valued, friends and contributors, to whose efficient and ready assistance the FORTNIGHTLY owes in great measure whatever of success it may, during the present year, have obtained.

The FORTNIGHTLY will next year be under the management of the following Board:

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CORRESPONDENCE

METHOD IN LEGAL INSTRUCTION.

Editor FORTNIGHTLY:—

In last issue of the FORTNIGHTLY a paragraph appeared, stating that the Faculty of Law contemplated adding a year to the Law course. From this I infer that a deeper, more critical and exact knowledge of legal principles is needed, and that to lengthen the course will remedy the defect, in the judgment of members of the Faculty.

I do not share in such opinion. The defect I believe to be fundamental, and the addition of one or even two years would not effect the improvement desired. I think if the methods of imparting a knowledge of the law were changed somewhat that a saving in time would result more than equivalent to an additional year with present methods.

A moment's consideration. What a young lawyer needs to possess when he comes to the practice of his profession is, I believe, a knowledge of the law, where to find it and how to use it. In McGill, about forty courses of lectures in various branches of law are delivered during the three year period, by eminent professors, to the assembled students of all the Years. Herein I find the first fundamental error: and while making proper allowance for the undoubted ability of the professors and the acknowledged cleverness of the students, it is nevertheless quite beyond the range of practical teaching to present the subject-matter of the lectures, under these circumstances, in such a manner as to insure the highest good or greatest possible progress equally to the members of the different Years. Should the professor address himself to the Third Year student, he talks over the heads of the First and Second Years, and presently much time is consumed in answering irrelevant and unimportant questions of inquiring minds, struggling with recondite principles and unfamiliar technicalities in their vain efforts to follow the lecturer. Or should he address himself to the First Year student, immediately he loses the attention of the other Years. Finally, in desperation, a middle course is determined on, with the obvious result that there is a preponderance of interrogation on the one hand and of restive indifference on the other.

Law is a science, and should be studied as such. Law is a growth, and its historical development ought to be chronologically presented. The subject-matter of law is Rights, and the natural unfolding of it should be logically presented to the receptive legal mind. Law is often found in tangled confusion, requiring correct and appropriate diction to state, define and disentangle. There is no science in which words and forms of expression are more important than law. Precision of definition and statement is a *sine qua non*. Possessing it, one possesses the law; not possessing it, one has only the power of vainly beating the air with uncertain words, which neither impress, instruct nor convince anybody. Applying this holding to the course of study in question, I find there is no adequate provision made for one to acquire that readiness, fluency and precision of statement, without which distinction in the profession of law is not probable. Why should one be compelled to wait until admitted to the bar before being afforded an opportunity of addressing a court? The other learned professions are in a much better position—the teacher learns by practice in the Normal School, the surgeon in the dissecting room, the theologian in the suburban chapel, but the young lawyer has no adequate provision made for the discussion of legal subjects. It is quite true that there is a Moot Court, but the number of cases argued before that tribunal has not