merce of Trinidad, I find the following:—"The Chamber has always been "favorably disposed towards closer trade relations within the Empire, but "at the same time is not unmindful of the advantages of the United States "market, more especially since the imposition there of countervailing "duties on bounty-fed sugar." I only use Trinidad's case by way of illustrating the lack of a trade plan within the Empire; other illustrations could be cited with equal force.

Canada occupies a more fortunate position than some other parts of the Empire; we are strong enough and prosperous enough to get along without any particular advantage in the British market, and it is not necessary for us to approach this question now, nor have we in the past, with a view of wringing some advantage from Great Britain which we cannot get along without. Years ago, sentiment being so strong in favor of Great Britain, that we refused the opportunity of making a treaty with the United States, which would have given us, in some commodities, more favorable trade relations, rather than give a preference to a foreign country against Great Britain; yet we find this is practically the thing which is happening with those less favored colonies.

Those nations which are becoming Great Britain's most aggressive competitors for her almost exclusive markets of the past, are free to operate in her home market, while reserving to themselves their home markets to the exclusion by high tariffs of British goods. These foreign tariffs would not be higher no matter in what way Britain took to defend her position and secure to her work-people, at least, in many things their own market.

There are no two countries where a certain fiscal policy will fit each other; there is no use wasting time discussing this question on the usual basis of Free Trade vs. Protection, as they are theoretically known; no radical change in a trade policy can be brought about in any country on short notice, but it would appear that some steps should be taken under the present conditions. By a commercial bond within the Empire, founded on moderate lines, carefully feeling the way year by year, a great and united Empire can be maintained and perpetuated under this commercial bond; each part, I believe, would be willing to assume its fair share of responsibility, which are chiefly those of mutual defence. What we have recently done in sending troops to assist Great Britain in South Africa is very little for a country so strong and wealthy as this, and it is not for anything we expect to receive in the future from Great Britain, although it is a proof of our good-will: it is rather a very slight token for all the blessings of peace which we have enjoyed under British rule and protection in the past.

The question of improving our coast defences, and in doing something in contributing to the navy, are proper questions for us to consider. I venture to think that we should have a force of regular soldiers independent of our militia—part of which might be on active duty and the balance on a reserve, in all at least 10,000 men, these for duty when the emergency demanded in any part of the Empire. I refer now to a new arrangement or readjustment whereby the Empire shall be drawn closer together, and this brings me to the vital question of representation.

I would not appear on my own behalf or that of the Board, to express dogmatic views, fully realizing the scriousness of this phase of the problem, still we will readily recognize that no substantial Federation can be operated without some provision, whereby the voice of the different parts of the Empire may be heard at its centre; it is not likely that it would be desirable to interfere in any radical manner with the Constitution of the Imperial House of Commons or House of Lords, as a Federation at the out-start would not likely embrace all parts of the Empire. I need not dwell upon the apportionment of Representatives from each part; there may be other plans. One, however, suggests itself—that of an Imperial Colonial Coun-