

fluence of the Crown arises from its Officers having the entire Management of the public Revenues : And if the Parliament should think fit to take it into their own Hands, and entrust it to Commissioners of their own Appointment, it would not only prevent any ill Effects of that Influence, but render their own Body infinitely more considerable. It is an old Observation, that Popes had vastly more Writers in favour of their exorbitant Claims, than general Councils had to support their just Rights ; the Reason of which was, that the former had abundance of Pre ments to bestow, the latter had none at all. The Case is the same between the Crown and the Parliament ; but were the latter to take the Management of the Revenues into their Hands, and commit the Receipts and Issues thereof to their own Commissioners and Officers, they would soon have as great Court made to them, as ever was made to the most despotic Minister at the Head of the Treasury. The Commons would have no Reason to envy the superior Dignity of the Lords, whilst they found themselves more capable of doing Good in the World, of encouraging Merit, and of restoring the Virtue of their Country. Gentlemen, and indeed all Orders of Men through the Kingdom, would then endeavour to deserve well of their Country, as the only Way to recommend them to the Favour of Parliament for Preferment : They would enjoy their Posts with Honour and Dignity in the Eye of the World, and with an inexpressible Satisfaction in their own Breasts, when they owe them purely to their Merit, and not to the dear-bought Favour of a Minister, whose Benefactions are not to be obtained at a less Rate, than the Dishonour of a Man's Character, and the Ruin of his Virtue. This would naturally bring the Nation to that happy Pass, so much recommended by Dr. Davenant, in the 5th Section of his *Essay* before quoted,