

climate and the distances they have to travel to get to the market place them under substantial hardships. Consequently, the benefit of that quota should be Canada's benefit in the main. Governments can only provide opportunities, can only open the door. It is for industries to take advantage of the opportunities and pass through the entrance that is obtained.

In respect of the tobacco provisions of the treaty, I have to admit frankly that I cannot make any satisfactory answer at the moment to the questions put by the honourable senator who has just spoken; but I will undertake that as good an answer as I can find shall be given at the appropriate time, when the treaty itself is under review. I should think that when the treaty expires—but I am speaking only off-hand—all its provisions would expire, but probably the ten-year limit that is in the tobacco provisions is one that obtains when the treaty goes on, as it is contemplated that it will go on, past the ordinary five years named in the provisions.

There has been criticism offered of certain terms of these pacts that have to do with the principles which Canada must follow, in compliance with the pacts themselves, in relation to tariff policy. The only complaint is that these are principles that no government would think of violating. Possibly that is true. But the difference between what is going to exist under this treaty and what has existed will be this: under the treaty a tribunal with the status of a court will be established—it is already established, it is true, but it will be given functions under this treaty—before which tribunal all questions having to do with the application of those principles will be dealt with. In a word, the actual application of the principles that we all agree should be adhered to is shifted from the political arena of give-and-take, from what is usually called log-rolling, to a tribunal that will base its decisions upon certain definite ideas and principles. Surely that is an advance.

It is stated here, for example, that Great Britain shall have competitive conditions of trade with this Dominion. That is to say, if the level of wages is at a certain point in England and at another point here, the tariff shall be such as will reasonably atone for that difference in wages—and of course for differences in other factors of production too. But it shall not go beyond that; it shall not reach any exclusive or prohibitive status at all.

The level of competition shall be maintained so that the British producer will have an equal show, regard being had to the different costs of production, with the producer in this country. No one could describe the practice, if it follows that principle, as being high or prohibitive protection. It is only what is fair—and, indeed, essential, if industry in this country is to live. What I contend at the moment is that it is infinitely better to have the application of that principle in the hands of an impartial tribunal, operating with the status of a court of justice, before which all interested parties can be heard—the final decisions, of course, having to be with the Parliament of Canada—it is infinitely better to have the principle reviewed before such a tribunal and to have that tribunal's report before us than it is to have things done in the rather haphazard and certainly none too successful way in which they have been done in the past.

I have not observed in the treaty any terms under which Canada can argue before a court in Great Britain that Canadian producers of grain or metals have been complying with provisions of the treaty to the effect that they must have the goods to sell and be willing to sell them at world prices on the British market in order to get the prior entrance into that market which the treaty provides. But I do not think we need worry very much on that score about the grain producers, for we know their trouble is that they have the goods and want to sell them. That is their distinct objective, their only objective. There is no danger in the world about their not being ready to supply the British market with the quantity of goods that market can consume—and indeed with double the quantity—at all times. And I do not think there is very much danger that the producers of lead, zinc and copper, who also get advantages by way of priority under the treaty, are going to be in default in that regard. If difficulties should arise that could not be settled by an interchange of views, there would be, I think, no objection by any party to this treaty to our being given the right to be heard either before a tribunal in Great Britain or before the Government itself. The fact is that the British Government felt that the principles set up would be fair if they were carried out, and they were content to leave the carrying out of them to a judicial tribunal. In this way they are relieved from the uncertainty that would follow if the execution of the treaty were left to the varying vagaries of succeeding governments in Canada.