

*Routine Proceedings***Question No. 44—Mr. Chatters:**

With respect to financial audits conducted by or for the government on Indian bands, tribal councils and aboriginal/Metis organizations, (a) how many audits were conducted during the last five years, (b) how many were considered fully satisfactory and approved by the government, (c) how many received a failing grade from the government?

Mr. Peter Milliken (Parliamentary Secretary to Leader of the Government in the House of Commons): I am informed by the Departments of Canadian Heritage, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Justice and the Privy Council Office as follows:

In so far as Canadian Heritage is concerned: (a) two; (b) two; (c) Please refer to Justice's reply, part (c).

In so far as Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada is concerned in the past three years—DIAND's automated audit tracking system contains three years of data, (a) 2,034 audits were conducted; (b) 1,573 unqualified and 318 qualified audit opinions were accepted by the department. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants has classified audits into three categories, unqualified, qualified and denial of opinion. A denial of opinion is not accepted by the government; and (c) 143 audits have a denial of opinion. DIAND prepares action plans to address financial management problems for those recipients who have a denial of opinion.

DIAND does not fund Metis organizations. For such organizations, please refer to the answers provided by Canadian Heritage, Justice and the Privy Council Office.

In so far as the Department of Justice is concerned: (a) three; (b) one; (c) two. One audit was jointly sponsored by Canadian Heritage, the Federal-Provincial Relations Office of the Privy Council Office, Justice Canada, Saskatchewan Department of Social Services, the Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat.

In so far as the Privy Council Office is concerned: (a), (b) and (c) Please refer to Justice's reply, part (c).

Question No. 69—Mr. Bodnar:

With regard to the recent audit of the Saskatchewan Metis Nation, completed by Deloitte-Touche, (a) what was the total amount of expenditures questioned by the auditors, (b) in terms of these questioned expenditures, (i) who made each expenditure, (ii) for what amount, (iii) for what purpose and on what date?

Mr. Russell MacLellan (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada): Total amount of funding questioned by the auditors: \$2,770,131

Programs:

Core Program, 1993-1994
Canadian Heritage: \$514,180
Total: \$514,180

Tri-Partite Program, 1993-1994
Privy Council Office: \$313,320
Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat: \$313,320
Total: \$626,640

Core Program, 1992-1993

Canadian Heritage: \$601,311

Department of Justice: \$50,000

Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat: \$10,000
Total: \$661,311

Tripartite Program, 1992-1993

Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat: \$370,000

Department of Justice: \$460,600

Saskatchewan Social Services: \$71,000

Total: \$901,600

Fur Trappers Meeting, 1992-1993

Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat: \$10,000
Total: \$10,000

Justice System Program, 1992-1993

Department of Justice: \$56,400

Total \$56,400

Question No. 82—Mr. Cummins:

What effect did the late signing of the aboriginal fishing agreements in British Columbia have on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans enforcement of the agreements and fisheries regulations in 1994?

Hon. Brian Tobin (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans): On September 23 the hon. member raised the question of the impact of the late signing of agreements on enforcement and regulation of British Columbia fisheries. On November 18 a response was provided which assessed the impact of late signing on the overall enforcement of agreements and regulations pertaining to management of the aboriginal fishery.

The answer provided to the question posed by the hon. member in September was neither inaccurate nor misleading. The response acknowledged that late signing did have some effect.

In characterizing this effect as small, the response was correct in the context of management of aboriginal fishing throughout British Columbia and in the context of the legal capacity to enforce against unauthorized fishing. The question posed by the hon. member was set in both these contexts. The response was not meant to imply that in specific areas and for specific agreements the late signing of agreements did not have negative implications as recorded in the documents cited by the hon. member.

The response characterized the effect on "enforcement of the agreements and fisheries regulations" as small for the following reasons:

1. The integrity of management systems made up of both agreements and regulations was maintained. All aboriginal salmon fishing before the signing of agreements was licensed under the aboriginal communal fishing licence regulations. These licences provided an enforceable framework for the control of aboriginal fishing until agreements were signed.

2. While there were problems with the implementation of some of the more complex agreements, particularly the Sto:Lo agreement, these instances must be interpreted in the context of the 47 agreements signed in 1994 with aboriginal groups across British Columbia.