

region. However, neither do they refute the validity of the allegations nor in any way allay our sense of concern. On the basis of Canadian investigations, anomalous epidemiological phenomena in Southeast Asia in the early 1980's remain inadequately explained. The most salient point which Canada's investigative effort in that region underlines is the absolute necessity of full, prompt, unqualified co-operation on the part of all directly concerned parties if uncertainties about compliance are to be satisfactorily received. In the case of our own investigative activities, as in the case of a team of experts sent to the area by the UN Secretary General in 1981, such co-operation was not forthcoming. We note that uncertainties relating to other alleged breaches of the Convention have similarly not been resolved. This is an unsatisfactory and unacceptable situation.

In the face of this situation, involving widespread doubts about the possibility of ever being able to devise adequate and practicable verification provisions, as well as persisting unresolved uncertainties relating to allegations of non-compliance, it would be all too easy to lapse into a despairing, do-nothing attitude. However, such a defeatist approach would only undermine the established norm against biological weapons. This Convention, which remains a legally binding instrument for all States Parties, is the strongest embodiment of that norm. The Canadian Government considers