

7. Finally, proposals were advanced to amend the Convention to cover blinding weapons, certain types of small-arms and naval mines. These proposals have not yet elicited consensus.

II. Scope and Objectives of the Report

8. Against this background, the objective of this report is to advance some practical proposals for a CCW Convention verification regime. The report's central argument is that a revised CCW Convention will require an effective verification regime to provide all participating states with reasonable assurances that parties are in compliance. Such a regime will likely be modest at first, but may become more rigorous as states become more aware of the benefits verification can confer. As a first step in the process of regime formation, this report advocates the creation of a two-track verification regime. The first track, dealing with *international* conflicts, will involve the creation of a Verification Commission comprising representatives of the States Parties and the use of fact-finding missions to investigate allegations of non-compliance. The second track, dealing with *non-international* conflicts, will involve confidence-building measures. It is envisaged that, over time, as all Parties become more comfortable with CCW verification, these two tracks will converge. The end product will be a verification regime that is effective and comprehensive, and that enjoys the support and confidence of all the States Parties.

9. It should be noted at the outset that the focus of this report is on landmines, reflecting the main focus of the Expert Group meetings to date. Outside of the technical dimension, however, there seems to be little in the logic of either the basic argument or its particulars that could not apply to other types of weapons as well: most of the arguments for and against an effective verification regime apply whether one is verifying obligations governing landmines, blinding weapons or any other category of weapon regulated/proscribed by the CCW Convention.

10. This report also deals with issues related to CCW verification in non-international conflicts. Although the existing Convention applies only to international conflicts, an important thrust of the expert group meetings has been to extend its scope to cover non-international conflicts as well; for it is generally acknowledged that it is in the course of these conflicts that landmines are most frequently used in an indiscriminate and inhumane fashion. The extension of the scope of the Convention in this way is problematic, however. Nor is there agreement regarding the creation of an effective verification regime empowered to investigate alleged violations of the Convention, particularly in the context of non-international conflicts. This report will seek to address questions regarding the utility and feasibility of a verification regime, focusing in particular on the possibility that such a regime could evolve over time to cover both international and non-international armed conflicts.