

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

become parties to the Convention can depend on the support of other States parties in meeting a chemical weapons threat, the pressures to withdraw from the Convention in order to match the chemical weapons capability of an adversary would be considerably reduced.

Besides promoting the universality and viability of the Convention, effective provisions on assistance would by themselves have a deterrent effect upon States which might be considering the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or contemplating their use. If a State still undertakes the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or resorts to their use, an authoritative finding by the Executive Council to this effect would be of great political value. In addition, the assistance which the Executive Council or individual States might extend to the threatened State would hopefully enable it to cope with the situation which it faces.

The language proposed by Pakistan for article X is contained in the annex to document CD/752. It builds on the assistance provisions contained in two earlier multilaterally negotiated conventions, namely the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the ENMOD Convention of 1977. Our proposal seeks to expand and strengthen these provisions, keeping in view the differences in the subject-matter of these three agreements. Relatively few States, it is believed, had biological weapons programmes at the time of the conclusion of the BW Convention, and instances of use of these weapons in the past have been infrequent. Similarly, environmental modification techniques have apparently not been employed on the scale that that Convention prohibits. As against this, the chemical weapons threat is much more serious. These weapons have often been used in this century, and exist today in the arsenals of an increasing number of States. In view of these considerations, we feel that assistance provisions of the kind contained in the BW and ENMOD conventions would not be adequate for a chemical weapons convention, unless they are considerably improved upon.

Under our proposal, the threatened State would be able to call for assistance not only against another State party but also any other State whose activities present a threat to the objectives of the Convention. Such a request would be addressed to the Executive Council, which would in the first instance undertake a factual determination as to whether the requesting State faced a chemical weapons threat. In carrying out this task, the Executive Council would have the power to initiate an investigation or inquiry, including on-site inspection. In the event of a finding that the requesting State did face a chemical weapons threat, the Executive Council would also be obliged to decide on concrete measures of assistance to the threatened State including, in particular, assistance in protective measures. The precise nature and modalities of the assistance to be given would be for the Executive Council to decide in each individual case, depending on the circumstances. In addition to any collective action which the Executive Council might undertake, individual States would also be in a position to assist the requesting State once the Executive Council had determined that it faced a chemical weapons threat.