

At the Summit Meeting, the world was confronted with a series of imaginative and constructive plans, approaching the problems of disarmament from a variety of angles admittedly, but as has been stressed by the representative of France, not in a mutually incompatible fashion. This array of new ideas may have distracted attention, however, from the formidable and so far unsolved difficulties as regards the possibility of effectively controlling the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that since that important Summit Meeting, all discussions directly or indirectly have been dominated by this new factor and by attempts to develop formulae which would take account of its implications.

In view of the current, and I trust, temporary scientific difficulties which I have just mentioned, our position in regard to disarmament, given the proposals which have been submitted so far, can be summarized in three clear and simple propositions.

My first proposition is that because it cannot be effectively controlled, the elimination of nuclear weapons cannot at this time be part of a programme of disarmament to be implemented immediately. True, all of us retain the hope that soon it may be possible to devise means whereby control will be possible. In the meantime it is not realistic nor helpful to suggest, as is done in the latest Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva, that "effective international control shall be established over the implementation of measures for ... the prohibition of atomic weapons". The plain truth is that at the present time a complete prohibition of atomic weapons cannot be effectively controlled. And no one has stated this more clearly than the Soviet Government in its May 10th proposals. Surely, all efforts will continue to be made, as suggested by the Western Powers in Geneva, to search for a solution to this problem.

I wish to stress at this point that the policy of my government on prohibition of nuclear weapons has not changed. Now as in the past we support the prohibition of nuclear weapons as part of a general disarmament scheme provided adequate control is both scientifically and technically feasible and accepted by all parties concerned. We must come back again and again to the question of control. As long as the solution is not available the only honest and practical position that it is possible to take is to acknowledge the fact and recognize the limitations it involves. To agree to a complete but unverifiable prohibition now would be to accept a gamble with national security which no responsible government could take. We are not asking the U.S.S.R. to accept such a risk, and, in the present state of international relations, little purpose is gained and much may be lost in attempting to exploit for any purpose (I have got 'propaganda purposes' written in my text, but I am leaving that out) the refusal on the part of any country to jeopardize its security by taking such a gamble.

My second proposition is that, if the bomb cannot effectively be banned now and the major political issues resolved, this does not mean that we should fold our arms and do nothing or that we should necessarily restrict ourselves to the setting up of an alarm system or to experimentation with pilot schemes. It is agreed by all concerned that a broad area in the field of conventional