cited, seem to us to tell in reality the other way. Another class of cases in which a trust has been held valid, though it can hardly be said to be for the benefit of any person or persons, is where provision has been made for the maintenance of favorite animals after their owner's death. Thus, in *Mitford* v. *Reynolds*, 17 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 238; 16 Sim. 105, a testator gave the remainder of his property, "after deducting the annual amount that will be requisite to defray the keep of my horses (which I will and direct be preserved as pensioners)," to the Government of Bengal for a charitable purpose; and the order on further consideration contained a declaration that the provision for the maintenance of the testator's horses was good. The point was probably uncontested. The next case of the kind—*In re Dean; Cooper Dean* v. *Stevens*, 58 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 693; L.R. 41 Chanc. Div. 552—came before Mr. Justice North in 1889. There a testator charged his land with an annuity of £750, to be paid to his trustees during fifty years from his death if any of his horses or hounds should so long live, and declared that the trustees should apply the money in their maintenance, and Mr. Justice North held the trust a valid one. His judgment, which is a valuable statement of the law, begins as follows: "It is said that there is no *cestui que trust* who can enforce the trust, and that the court will not recognise a trust unless it is capable of being enforced by some one. I do not assent to that view. There is not the least doubt that a man may, if he pleases, give a legacy to trustees upon trust to apply it in erecting a monument to himself, either in a church or in a churchyard, or even in unconsecrated ground, and I am not aware that such a trust is in any way invalid, although it is difficult to say who would be the *cestui que trust* of the monument. In the same way I know of nothing to prevent a gift of a sum of money to trustees upon trust to apply it for the repair of such a monument. In my opinion such a trust would be good, although the testator must be careful to limit the time for which it is to last, because, as it is not a charitable trust, unless it is to come to an end within the limits fixed by the rule against perpetuities, it would be illegal. But a trust to lay out a certain sum in building a monument, and the gift of another sum in trust to apply the same to keeping that monument in repair, say for ten years, is, in my opinion, a perfectly good trust, although I do not see who could ask the Court to enforce it. If persons beneficially interested in the estate could do so, then the present plaintiff can do so; but, if such persons could not enforce the trust, still it cannot be said that the trust must fail because there is no one who can actively enforce it." On the other hand, as lending some support to the general proposition quoted at the commencement of this article, we may refer the reader to the observations of Lord Eldon in the well-known case of *Morice* v. *The Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 522, 539, and also to the actual decision in *Brown* v. *Burdett*, 52 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 52; L.R. 21 Chanc. Div. 667, where an eccentric testatrix devised a house to trustees with specific directions to block it up for the term of twenty years, putting only a housekeeper in occupation, and subject thereto to hold it in trust for a devisee in fee, and Vice-Chancellor Bacon, saying he must "unseal this useless, undisposed-of property," held that there was an intestacy for the term. The case, however, was argued on the footing that there was no disposition by