

surely no, because they want the faculty to judge of such things.

I shall give yet one illustration more from the department of ordinary morals. You can imagine a person, not indeed without a conscience, but with his conscience so perverted from various causes, that it is impossible for him in that state to see the viciousness or impropriety of actions which to another person, in an ordinary state of moral feeling, are self-evidently wrong. Such a case furnishes an example very analogous to those already adduced, of one class of men possessing a certain capacity wanting in another class, the former being (in respect of the possession of that capacity) perfect, as contrasted with the latter, who are imperfect; and the consequence of this difference being that judgments in the branch of knowledge of which the faculty in question takes cognizance, can be formed by the former, perfectly valid,—valid in themselves, and felt to be so by him who forms them, though their validity is not apparent to, nor even comprehensible by the latter.

Now, mark the purpose for which I have adduced those examples. I consider them to cast a strong and important light upon the many passages in the Word of God, of which the text is one, which tell us that, in order to judge of the subject-matter of the Gospel,—whether it be true or false, excellent or unworthy of attention,—a peculiar preparation of mind and heart, a peculiar faculty, or whatever it may be termed, is requisite. One man, on hearing the doctrine of the cross announced, at once exclaims, "That is all absurdity, it is foolishness!" He thinks it unnecessary to inquire what external evidences of its divine origin exist. Its internal character is to him sufficient to justify his immediate rejection of it. Another, who has not any more than the first examined the external evidences of Christianity, finds in the Gospel, on the contrary, characters which irresistibly impress him as furnishing a proof of