

the fact that when General Sikorski was in Moscow M. Stalin had referred to the Ukrainians with contempt and hostility. The Ukrainians, M. Stalin is alleged to have said, have always been a nuisance to their neighbours and would later have to be dealt with drastically. The Russian Government had every intention of eradicating Ukrainian ideas of autonomy, and he had no doubt that the Polish Government would see an advantage in taking the same sort of line. But now, said M. Grabski, the tune had changed and in the *Radyanska Ukraina-Pravda* article the period of Soviet rule in the Western Ukraine (i.e., Eastern Galicia and Polish Volhynia) was depicted as a golden age for Ukrainian culture.

6. Polish officials seem to have little doubt that the future foreign policy of the Soviet Government will be revolutionary in the same sense that its policy and the policy of the Comintern has been revolutionary during the last twenty-five years. One condition for the successful prosecution of a revolutionary foreign policy is, they hold, that the inhabitants of the Soviet Union must be kept in ignorance of social conditions outside the Soviet Union; and a special reason for the liquidation of the Polish relief organisations in Russia is, it is thought, to be found in the fact that the tinned food sent to Russia for relief purposes was superior to anything which the inhabitants of the Union can normally get. The activities of the Polish relief centres, therefore, suggested to the native population that perhaps it was not after all true, as they had always been told, that economic conditions in the Soviet Union were much better than those in the Western European countries. I think there must be something in this point, for I remember stories which reached us in Budapest during the winter of 1939-40 of the surprise with which Russian troops entering Poland found shops much better stocked with all ordinary articles of commerce than they had ever been in Russia, and the dismay with which Russian officials had observed the effect which this revelation was having upon the political ideas of the Soviet troops.

7. The Poles tell me, not unreasonably, that they know a great deal more about Russia than we do, and that we are wrong in expecting any response in action to efforts on our part to conciliate the Soviet Government and get its confidence. I do not, of course, myself know as to how far in this they are right or wrong, but, although the last thing I should wish to do is to poach on Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's side of the Riga frontier, I may perhaps be allowed to quote a private letter which I happened to get to-day from a friend who had been on a temporary mission to Moscow. "The Russians," my correspondent says, "know what they want and why; and if you do, too, it is usually possible to come to an understanding. It takes a great deal of force and persistence and good manners are not necessary. I have had two flaming rows with a Russian Government Department lately, in the first of which I came off worst through trying methods of ordinary courtesy and Western guile. In the second, and several subsequent minor ones, I got what I wanted by refusing to budge, by bad manners, and by threats of retaliation. The one thing these people respect is strength: not because they are oriental or weak, but because they are strong and have no use for anyone who is not. Good manners, religion, compassion and so on, they dismiss as 'Sklavenmoral'. Politeness, conciliation propaganda, &c., is often misunderstood and harmful in the sense that these things make them think us rather ineffectually byzantine." My Polish friends take rather the same sort of line, but they add that, though the Russians are strong, the Soviet Government has its own difficulties which are probably more numerous than we always realise. It is therefore to be anticipated, they say, that if with reference to the recent anti-Polish measures and pronouncements of the Soviet Government we were to show them a red light, they would desist from courses which might eventually, to our great embarrassment, oblige us to come more into the open in opposition to Russian ambitions and in supporting what used to be called "self-determination" than would be at all favourable to Anglo-Russian co-operation in the prosecution of the war.

8. So much for initial conversations with Poles in respect of which I would wish to make it quite plain that I am not using a description of Polish views and feelings as cover for opinions of my own, which at this early stage it would be most inappropriate for me to form.

9. On the 27th February the newspapers published the text of a second Polish resolution passed in this case by the National Council instead of by the Council of Ministers. It ran as follows:—

"The National Council, maintaining, in unanimous agreement with the Government, its attitude that the difficulties which exist in creating mutual trust in the collaboration between the United Nations must be removed,