

'ready to go' and was in fact rather impatient to get started." Udall "did not seem to be too disturbed at the possibility that ratification here might be delayed until the autumn," but he "intimated that a delay into next year could have the effect of requiring a re-examination by the United States of alternative possibilities to the proposed Columbia development" (Document 439). By November, ratification seemed as far off as ever. From the embassy in Washington, Saul Rae reported to Ottawa that he and his colleagues had "studiously avoided raising the question of the Columbia River Treaty with United States officials." However, the American press was beginning to make adverse comments on the delays caused by Premier Bennett (Document 448). Not wishing the treaty to lapse, by the end of the year the members of the Cabinet had agreed that they were "willing to make some compromise with the government of British Columbia if necessary to achieve the purpose of the Treaty" (Document 458).

Canada's relations with the United Kingdom during 1961 were also marked by a growing tendency to conflict. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was firm in his belief that there should be no open condemnation of South Africa's racial policies at the 1961 meeting of Commonwealth leaders, and that South Africa should be encouraged to remain within the association. Diefenbaker, who recounted that he had "given the matter a great deal of thought," wished to take a stand on apartheid, but he was also "most reluctant to be responsible for South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth" (Document 459). Bryce believed strongly that action by Canada was necessary, so that "the value of the Commonwealth as a bridge between the white and coloured will be strengthened" (Document 461). From London, High Commissioner George Drew reported that British officials were assiduously spreading the view that "all Commonwealth countries but Canada" were ready to take a moderate stance on South Africa. Drew himself was convinced that, on the contrary, "Malaya, India, Ghana and Nigeria would probably welcome a firm stand" (Document 462). Diefenbaker was now resolved "to condemn apartheid strongly" (Document 472), but he also hoped for some concessions on the part of South Africa which might allow the issue to be deferred for another year. At the meeting, he suggested that no direct criticism of South Africa should be made, but that the Prime Ministers should collectively issue a statement describing the Commonwealth as a multi-racial organization. Under these circumstances, the South Africans chose to leave the Commonwealth. It was a diplomatic triumph: the desired result had been obtained, but Canada could not be held responsible for "forcing" South Africa out.

There was general elation in Ottawa over this result, but reports from Drew accused the British of attempting to cast blame on Canada through stories planted in the press. Drew suspected that a similar approach would be taken by the British regarding the possibility that they might join the European Economic Community (see Document 506). The British offered reassurances that Commonwealth nations would be consulted before any decisive step was taken, but it seemed likely that the consultation process would be a mere matter of form. Diefenbaker, concerned by the prospect of seeing Canada's trade ties with the U.K. disrupted, felt that "[a] subject of