

very closely at what the documents reveal about those charged with the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of Canadian external policy. Perhaps then we shall be able to explain their apparent atavism in situations of great stress where no small power could decisively influence events and where sovereignty was not necessarily a meaningful term.

Certainly, Canadian policy often seemed deliberately cloaked in confusion and decidedly negative in substance. Confrontation in international policies was an evil; collective security, an anathema. International appeasement and conciliation, if not vigorously pursued, were at least to be applauded and encouraged. No commitments, the avoidance of consultation (of course, we were offended when we were not consulted on questions that affected us) and a minimum of public examination and debate were the means adopted in achieving the "safety" of a back-seat position in international affairs. At all costs, Canada must avoid encouraging Britain in any course that might lead to war and thus expose the Anglo-Canadian relationship and threaten the partisan balance of domestic politics.

Nowhere does there appear in the documents, except perhaps on a limited *ex post facto* basis, any appreciation of the greater issues involved in the crises that led to World War II. A crocodile tear or two might be shed at the passing of Loyalist Spain or Czechoslovakia but not even that was risked until they were well and truly dead. When war came, the Mackenzie King government quietly, if despairingly, accepted it for all the *wrong* reasons.

Obviously, the question of the Imperial relationship and of Canada's status as an international person pervades most of Volume Six. That Canada did not receive the full recognition she sought may be taken as but a reflection of her inability to come effectively to grips with the opportunities presented for sovereign status by the Balfour Report and the Statute of Westminster. If her policy-makers could scarcely convince themselves that she was a free state, they were not likely to convince anyone else. Indeed, they were never able to convey the message of her changed status to the United States where, apart from Britain, it mattered most. To quote President Roosevelt's Kingston speech of 1938, Canada remained for the United States "part of the sisterhood of the British Empire". The "Good Neighbour" policy to the contrary, Canada never fitted into the pattern of United States inter-American policies and Roosevelt's extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada looms much larger in retrospect than it did at the time. It is interesting to note that at the Yalta Conference in 1945 the United States considered and initially desired a multiple vote in the new United Nations organization because she regarded Dominion votes as extra votes for Britain—a view she had held when the question had arisen at Paris in 1919 concerning votes in the League of Nations. In effect, then, the North Atlantic Triangle was without balance. Isolationist policies precluded United States leadership in international affairs and Canada was not a natural part of the Pan-American Union.