

limited to declared reactor sites. Secret sites are secret. The most frequently inspected countries are those that need it least -- Japan, Germany and Canada.

What we need is a system of "challenge" inspections, with recourse to the Security Council for authority if necessary. To do this, the IAEA will need more inspectors. For this, the IAEA will need more money and Canada is prepared to pay up. Let's remember that Canada -- very early in the postwar period -- had the basic capacity to develop nuclear weapons. We chose not to then and we choose not to today. We urge others to do the same.

Third, the countries able to supply the materials, technology, and know-how need tighter supplier controls. Full scope safeguards must be a condition of any supply. In my view, adherence to the NPT ought to be another condition. A strengthened missile technology control regime is a necessary complement.

Fourth, we have to build the sort of regional peace and security regimes which will give some of the non-signatories to the NPT the political basis to join. That is happening between Brazil and Argentina.

In Europe, the Helsinki Summit in July of the 48 members of the CSCE -- we two North Americans and 46 Europeans and climbing -- will strengthen the security regime for Europe.

But there remains a real problem in South Asia that your country is trying to resolve.

In the Middle East, a lasting peace settlement is the only security guarantee. The Middle East peace process, once again brokered by the U.S., in which Canada has a sensitive role dealing with refugees, is moving in that direction.

As for outlaw countries such as North Korea, Iraq and any others aiming at nuclear weapons, they must be cajoled, squeezed, isolated and made to pay economically. Rest assured, the United Nations won't let Saddam Hussein off the hook -- he can play for time, but his weapons manufacturing facilities are coming down.

Fifth, the developed world has to realize it's dependent on the political will of others if we are to stop nuclear proliferation. Nuclear co-operation for peaceful use has to be more available, on tightened terms of safety.

These five steps then need our support and other steps may need to be considered.

This issue -- ending the threat of nuclear proliferation -- moves to the heart of our security concerns and only global co-operation will solve it.