

Secretary-General to invoke Article 99 in a situation where there is no real possibility of the Security Council agreeing on any useful positive role."¹¹ Nevertheless, his patience reached its limits in the East Pakistan/Bangladesh conflict of 1971. In the first part of the year, the Secretary-General found himself limited to a humanitarian role as millions of refugees fled to India from East Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan (supported by the USSR and the US, respectively) wanted the UN to intervene politically, and considered the matter an "internal affair." But U Thant recognized the serious potential for international armed conflict and on July 20, in a written memorandum, privately urged the Council to intervene, despite the slim chances that the Council would act. "The crisis is unfolding in the context of the long-standing, and unresolved, differences between India and Pakistan—differences which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago. ... [A] major conflict in the subcontinent could all too easily expand ... [T]he present situation [is] a potential threat to peace and security ... It is for these reasons that I am taking the unusual step of reporting to the President of the Security Council on a question which has not been inscribed on the Council's agenda."¹² A few weeks later, U Thant made his memorandum public after the Council ignored it, to further prod it. But the Council (led by the superpowers) continued to avoid the dealing with the situation right up to the beginning of war in December 1971.

Perhaps the greatest failure and the greatest success in early warning took place during the tenure of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Before the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, many signals went unheeded by the UN and important avenues were left uninvestigated, leading to the UN's unpreparedness and helplessness in the face of an unprecedented escalation of conflict and a genocide that led to approximately a million deaths. Some of ignored signals in Rwanda are described later in this paper.

By contrast, the signals of danger in Macedonia were not ignored. Here, the main credit for sounding the alarm goes to the Republic's President, Kiro Gligorov. He raised the issue with the Secretary-General in the fall of 1992 and lobbied the Council's leading members to promote an active response. The new state, born in September 1991 out of the break up of the former Yugoslavia, found itself faced immediately with enormous internal and external threats. The country possessed a diverse ethnic mixture: three-fifths Macedonian, one-fifth Albanian, and the rest Turks, Greeks, Gypsies, Serbs, Vlachs, Muslim Slavs and Bulgarians. The land-locked nation of 2 million is "surrounded by countries with a historical claim to the territory, a political claim to protect an ethnic minority, or, in the case of Greece, a diplomatic claim to the very name Macedonia."¹³ Should one neighbor intervene, others likely would follow, leading to a European war that could bring in NATO partners Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. The deployment of UN monitors along the Macedonian border served as a deterrent to aggression