

from these can be used to enhance the overall capabilities of NTM/ITM/MTM. In some cases, NTM/ITM/MTM could provide early indications of planned military activities requiring implementation of CBMs and could detect certain activities which should have been subject to CBMs.

Synergistic Effects among Cooperative Measures. The synergistic effects between OSIs, data exchanges, and notifications are of high value. They tend to be mutually reinforcing in many different ways. Data exchanges pinpoint locations which can be targeted for OSIs; OSIs can confirm data provided in the exchanges or detect inconsistencies. Notifications can trigger and direct both OSIs and aerial surveillance; in turn, they can confirm the accuracy of the notifications. Aerial surveillance can do preparatory work for OSIs by developing unclassified site maps and pinpointing promising search strategies; it can also monitor the perimeter around a facility prior to the arrival of an OSI team; verify certain baseline data; document elimination of TLEs; and monitor compliance with military exercise limitations. OSIs hold the potential to "flush out" illegal TLIs which can then be detected by aerial surveillance or other means.

NIM and Data Exchanges. NIM can provide a useful check on information provided in data exchanges. Information obtained from human sources and in open literature falls into a number of data categories, for example: sightings of weapons, weapon launching pads or bases, and submarine or naval sightings; construction of new roads, tunnels, emplacements, military camps, airfields, and radar stations; and military budgets and personnel levels. This information can be compared with that provided in data exchanges. In addition, since human sources may be unreliable, and open literature may include "planted" material, data exchanges are a means of checking on the reliability of the sources for NIM.

NIM and Notifications. NIM sources can also provide information associated with notifications, such as loading or unloading activities, evacuation of families from certain areas, movement of military convoys, activity at underground installations and caves, and military training activity. As in the case of data exchanges, the NIM sources may add to the knowledge base obtained through the notification process; and again, notifications may well serve as a check on the reliability of the NIM sources. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, U-2 photography of Cuba was focussed on areas highlighted by human source information; the photographs provided a reliable, objective view to counter what was at times misleading and inaccurate information.

NIM and OSIs. The synergistic effects between NIM and OSIs are very high. Information from NIM can be used to trigger OSIs. In the UNSCOM inspections, for example, information from a "whistle blower" provided the inspectors with the information necessary to know that material was being moved clandestinely out of an area in advance of the inspection.

NIM and Aerial Surveillance. In addition to reports from human sources such as refugees, whistle blowers, defectors, and agents, NIM sources include blueprints of facilities, studies, media reports, photos, and commercial aerial surveillance. Information from NIM can provide clues about activities which merit closer examination by aerial surveillance. Such information, for example, can provide advance warning of activity in time to schedule flights over specific geographical areas. Conversely, aerial inspections may detect suspect activities which can become the focus of NIM.

NIM and Confidence-Building Measures. Information exchanges and notifications are two areas in which it is possible to compare material received from NIM sources with that received through CBMs. The CSBMs contained

