

*Part Three* included three measures to "develop and amplify" the measures agreed to in Stockholm. These involved lowering the thresholds for notifications and observations; improving observation conditions; and providing better information in the annual calendars.

*Part Four* proposed sub-regions in which specific CSBMs would apply.

Finally, *Part Five* proposed such measures as the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the danger of war and prevention of surprise attack, and the discussion of military doctrine.

Romania also put forward a set of proposals in the first round of talks.

Following the end of the first round, Western negotiators felt that some positive and common ground existed between the proposals. However, the West maintained its position that exercises involving naval or air forces alone should not be included in the talks, as they were not included in the mandate. The East's proposals for limiting the numbers and types of exercises were characterized as being unacceptable owing to the East's numerical and geographic advantages. NATO maintained that the large training exercises it conducted and the better training it provided for its troops helped to offset the numerical advantages of the Warsaw Pact. Constraints on this training, without corresponding reductions in force levels, would result in greater advantage to the Warsaw Pact.

Two Working Groups were formed in the second round: the first, to examine information, verification, communications and consultation; and the second, to consider constraining measures, notification, observation and calendar questions. Following a Western proposal, a third working group on developing an independent seminar on military policy and doctrine was established on 16 June 1989.

At the end of the third round, which was held from 8 September to 20 October 1989, the participants agreed on the dates and framework for a seminar on military doctrine. The latter took place from 16 January to 5 February 1990 and was attended by the top military officers of the thirty-five. Its purpose was "to allow for a discussion on military doctrine in relation to the posture, structure and activities of conventional forces in the zone. Likewise other connected issues of military doctrine bearing on military capabilities might be discussed."<sup>3</sup> Participants at the seminar, who included US General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Soviet General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, were careful to stress that the seminar was not a negotiating forum. The idea was "to try to begin to understand the motivations and intentions that lie behind military force structures and activities, an element that is obviously the key to mutual confidence."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1989), p. 402.B.242.

<sup>4</sup> John J. Maresca, "In Vienna, A Friendly Invasion." Ottawa: United States Embassy Text (15 January 1990).