

I.

INTRODUCTION*

This paper addresses some of the changing issues in continental defence, particularly as they affect Canada. It is now a commonplace to note that the strategic debate — not yet reflected in the force postures of the superpowers — has shifted inexorably to include defensive force deployments in the calculus of deterrence.¹ This shift has been accelerated and politicized by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), but it would be wrong to assume that SDI is the sole cause of the shift. Although it was given momentum by President Reagan's statement of 23 March 1983, the search for a defence against ballistic missiles long ante-dates SDI. In a parallel development, dissatisfaction with mutual assured destruction had steadily increased throughout the 1970s, and was voiced by critics ranging across the political spectrum.²

This debate clearly has implications for Canadian-US co-operation in North American defence. But there are additional factors which bear upon this co-operation. The first is the relatively swift emergence of cruise missiles as an element in strategic forces, able to combine an elusive second strike capability with the added dimension of surprise attack. The continuing rapid development of Soviet air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missile programmes is of particular interest in this respect.

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¹ To sample the debate, see eds. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, *Ballistic Missile Defence*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1983, especially Chapter 11, "Reactions and Perspectives: Nine Personal Views". For a strong statement of support for strategic defence, see Robert Jastrow, *How to Make Nuclear Weapons Obsolete* (Little, Brown & Co., Toronto 1985); the debate can also be followed in almost all recent issues of *International Security*.

² For example, see the debate between Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente", *Foreign Affairs*, 54, January 1976, pp. 207-32 and Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View", *Foreign Affairs*, 54, April 1976, pp. 462-81. For the criticism from the left, see Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y., 1982). In their book *The Death of Deterrence* (CND Publications, London 1984), Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers wrote: "stable deterrence through mutual assured destruction, if it ever existed, will soon be finished". More cynically, perhaps, Albert Carnesale commented in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, H.A.S.C. 99-18, Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament, p. 276: ". . . there are many of us who like assured destruction, but I don't know anybody who likes mutual assured destruction."