

32. CBMs aim at more transparency in order to avoid misperception and wrong reactions, and to increase predictability.
33. National Technical Means of surveillance are extraordinarily capable and easily dwarf any explicit substantive information that can be derived from CBMs.
34. The objective of CBMs is reassurance which is achieved by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity.
35. CBMs are measures for inducing an assurance of mind and firm beliefs in the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of other states with respect to their security policies and the facts about their military capabilities.
36. CBMs attempt to increase predictability (i.e. they help us to recognize "normal" patterns of military behaviour).

On the basis of this list of "attributes" what can we say about CBMs and CSBMs? First of all, most conceptions of Confidence Building appear to treat it (usually implicitly) as a psychological phenomenon, one that involves *communication, perception and intentions*. According to the majority of discussions, Confidence Building addresses military concerns, particularly *fear about surprise attack*. This focus is probably a residual feature of the Central European birthplace of the CBM idea. Many descriptions

⁴⁴ Explicitly separating "military" and "political" CBMs does run some potential risk of reifying existing tendencies in the arms control approaches of the East and the West but it does recognize the intrinsic differences in the two conceptions of Confidence Building. They are not necessarily incompatible, but they are definitely different.

⁴⁵ Many analysts seem to think that this is not so. There are simply no compelling grounds, however, for saying that CBMs are not a type of arms control. A general and widely accepted definition of arms control counts those measures which reduce the chance of war occurring or the severity of war if it should occur. CBMs clearly qualify as measures designed to reduce the chance of war. That CBMs do not involve actual force reduction is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the category of arms control measures. Indeed, there is also no obvious reason why measures involving force reductions should be excluded when measures sponsoring obvious equipment and manpower restrictions are counted as CBMs.

reveal a particular concern with rendering intentions somehow "transparent" so that potential adversaries will not misperceive (and hence not over-react to) legitimate, non-aggressive military behaviour. Most descriptions imply or state explicitly that CBMs are not arms control although the authors probably mean that CBMs do not (should not) deal with actual force reductions.

If we set aside the Eastern conception of Confidence Building with its very broad interest in political, social, economic and technical relations (what used to be called *detente* and what could now be called "political Confidence Building")⁴⁴ and restrict our attention to military CBMs, what sort of analytic definition begins to emerge from our examination of existing efforts to describe Confidence-Building Measures? Bearing in mind that we have yet to encounter two additional sources of insight ("categories" and "specific proposals") that will further enrich our understanding of the CBM concept, we can nevertheless begin to construct a working definition of military Confidence Building. On the basis of observations made by a number of analysts, we can say that Military Confidence-Building Measures are:

1. a variety of arms control measure⁴⁵ entailing
2. state actions
3. that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions⁴⁶ about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive

⁴⁶ CBMs only deal with correcting misperception only in situations where no genuine, premeditated aggressive intent exists. It is the province of other types of arms control or unilateral action to address situations where intentions are genuinely aggressive. This distinction ignores temporarily the problem of deliberately using CBMs for coercive purposes or to mask preparations for attack.

