There is no rule on the subject, so far as we know, and there ought not to be. The best men should always be selected. There is no part of the duty of a government so responsible as this: it is a sacred trust which should be exercised without fear, or favour, and regardless of political necessities, old-fashioned prejudices, or far-fetched theories.

It may further be noted in this connection that the amount of Chamber work in High Court cases now done by the County Judges, as local judges of those courts, helps to familiarize them with those classes of cases with which they had ceased to have any connection after leaving the Bar—as not being cognizable by the County Courts. In other respects, the procedure in the trial of cases, whether in the High Court or County Courts, is the same, and a familiarity with the rules of evidence is equally required for both.

CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

WILL—CONSTRUCTION—REVOCATION BY CODICIL OF GIFT OF A SHARE OF RESIDUE, AND DIRECTION THAT IT SHOULD FALL INTO RESIDUE.

In re Palmer, Palmer v. *Ainsworth*, (1893) 3 Ch. 369, the Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes, and Smith, L.JJ.) found it necessary to overrule the decision of Lord Cottenham in *Humble* v. *Shore*, 7 Ha. 247. A testator had, by his will, given a share of his residuary real and personal estate to his daughters, born in his lifetime, equally. By a codicil he declared that the share given to one of them should be for her life only, and that upon her death it should fall into and form part of his residuary estate. Stirling, J., following *Humble* v. *Shore*, held that the share which had been cut down to a life estate on the death of the life tenant was distributable as upon an intestacy; but the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the clear intention of the testator was that it should form part of the residuary estate, and the court was therefore bound to give effect to that intention in spite of the contrary decisions in *Humble* v. *Shore* and the cases which had followed it. As Lindley, L.J., said, *In re Morgan, Morgan* v. *Morgan* (see *ante* p. 20): "Many years ago the courts slid into the bad habit of deciding one will by the previous decisions upon other wills. Of course there are principles of law which are to be applied to all wills: but, if you once get at a man's intention, and there is no