

The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Harkness),
 The Postmaster General (Mrs. Fairclough),
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. MacLean),
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Starr),
 The Minister of Health and Welfare (Mr. Monteith),
 The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Hamilton),
 The Minister of Defence Production (Mr. O'Hurley),
 The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Sévigny),
 The Minister of Forestry and Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Flemming),
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Dinsdale),
 The Secretary of State (Mr. Halpenny),
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Martineau),
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Bell),
 The Minister without Portfolio (Senator McCutcheon),
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),
 The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Dr. Hodgson), (Mr. Labarge).

SITUATION IN THE CONGO

45. *The Secretary of State for External Affairs* said that the United Nations faced some serious problems in the Congo as a result of Prime Minister Adoula's request to the Union Minière to stop paying taxes to Katanga which were lawfully due to the Central Government. His objective was to prevent further military strengthening of Katanga. If the Union Minière agreed to this it might insist on U.N. protection. But the U.N. did not have the necessary force. It would be serious from the military point of view to attempt it. The Katanga forces almost outnumbered the U.N. forces by 2 to 1. The Union Minière was spread out and it would be almost impossible to give it full protection. However, the only hope was for Mr. Adoula's operation to proceed. He had gone as far as he could with Tshombe. The Belgians had moved in to support the U.N., but they needed some economic pressures on Tshombe if he did not agree. They were trying to get some of the Union Minière's money payable to the Central Government. This might eventually involve putting U.N. troops in to protect the mining companies. Canadian troops operated the central signal system. There might be shooting, and it was felt that Canada could hardly refuse to support the U.N. attempt to control Tshombe.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated (Minister's memorandum, Oct. 25 – Cab. Doc. 345/62).

46. *During the discussion* the following points were raised:

(a) Some said to use force would be contrary to Canada's stand enunciated in London. Others said it would only mean the use of force defensively to protect property.

(b) Some felt that Canada should never have sent troops into the Congo, and to use them in this way would be viewed with horror in the United Kingdom. Others added that the U.N. force did not have the strength to put the protective plan into effect. They had a poor command, they would have poor communications because of the widespread operation, and in general would be incapable of doing the job.

47. *The Cabinet* agreed that the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations should not indicate in the Congo Advisory Committee that Canada in any way approves of the proposed new approach to the Union Minière, or accepts any increased risks to Canadian personnel in the protection of Union Minière's interests, or that Canada is in favour of a new mandate being sought from the Security Council, as had been outlined in the memorandum to Cabinet (Cab. Doc. 345/62, Oct. 25).