

5. When it came to my turn to speak I said that while everybody agreed that the State Department must carry the Senate along with it the rest of us were under pressure from our own Governments to get something done and were hearing of the rise of opposition to the Treaty in some quarters. I said that the Canadian Government liked the language of Article 5 and wanted to keep the reference to military action. I did not think the language could be watered down very much because the public already knows too much about the language of this Article for us to be able to let it appear that we have weakened the obligation. On Scandinavia I said I thought the Canadian Government would favour a Scandinavian alliance linked in some manner with the North Atlantic Treaty, not necessarily on the basis of full partnership; but the Swedes ruled this out. I said we would be reluctant to see the supplies of arms, which would presumably not, in any case, be adequate to meet the demand, go to a country which was maintaining armed neutrality instead of taking a full risk.

6. In reply to these and similar arguments which were made by Mr. Legallais [Luxembourg] and Baron Silvercruys, Mr. Acheson emphasized that the rate of progress is controlled by the Senate rather than by himself. He promised that he would not dally unduly. On Scandinavia he suggested that we might consider three factors:

(1) If Norway and Denmark participate we shall have access to the necessary rights in Greenland. On the other hand, there seems to be a possibility that we can get the same rights some other way.

(2) If Norway and Denmark participate they are obligated to help any other party which is attacked. It has been agreed in the discussions that such help might take the form of maintaining non-belligerency. If consideration of the question reveals that non-belligerency is the form of help they are most likely to give they could give it just as well outside the Treaty as in.

(3) If Norway, Denmark and Sweden conclude a pact to protect one another and fulfil their obligations under the pact we should all be in the same war together anyway. The question is do we need Scandinavian bases or could we co-ordinate Scandinavian defence plans with our own by supplying arms to a Scandinavian alliance on the condition that we have staff talks with them. Staff talks with all three Scandinavian countries might be better than having Norway and Denmark in the Treaty and Sweden out.

7. There was inconclusive discussion on these points from which it emerged that the Swedish condition for a Scandinavian alliance was that there should be no staff talks even if they were secret, and that Norway would not join any such alliance with Sweden unless it were done with specific approval of the North Atlantic countries.

8. There was then some discussion of specific Articles in the Treaty. On Article 2 I informed Mr. Acheson that I had received instructions from you to secure stronger wording. I read part of your message EX-300 to the meeting. In reply to Mr. Acheson's objection that the Senators were fed up with treaties for the improvement of the general welfare I said that I wanted him to tell them about your political difficulties in Canada. I pointed out that it would be difficult to secure