

young generation, has come down to them from Taine and Renan in a direct line.

As I said above, Taine and Renan never reconsidered their philosophy. They went on believing that all phenomena, being reducible to material causes and effects, could be traced by science to their farthest origins. The consequence of this doctrine was double : first of all it was a denial of the necessity of faith, seeing that there were no mysteries, and furthermore it was a denial of God. So belief in science was associated with complete religious incredulity. Crude minds, which are always anxious to appear free from trammels, affected exceedingly scientific principles.

Experience alone would have been enough to explode the scientific fallacy : Pasteur said that the deeper he went, the more difficult the discovery of causes became ; and everybody must notice, as well as this great man, that the riddle of the universe was no nearer its solution in the nineteenth century than it was in the days of Aristotle. But the belief in science, which was a dogma with Taine, was denounced by men who were not Taine's inferiors either as *savants* or as philosophers. Only specialists know the names of M. Lachelier and M. Boutroux, but everybody knew the name of Brunetière, who went round proclaiming the 'bankruptcy of science', and most people who count came to hear of the famous mathematician Poincaré, and especially of the famous philosopher Bergson, who at the present moment is by far the most successful exponent of his speciality. And what is the gist of Bergson's teaching ? the very reverse of Taine's : it is the multiform affirmation that science is a mere construction of the intellect and that we have no guarantee of its accuracy ; it is, moreover, an affirmation that there is a spiritual element in man and in the