

miraculous birth, and come to a miraculous close. What so natural as the production of the supernatural! Given a man of grand intellect, ecstatic temperament, good morals—in connection with an ignorant people of active imagination, and see the result,—the mythic—historic Christ! How beautiful, captivating the taste of our age, and fully explaining to the critical conception the most wonderful events the world ever witnessed!

This theory derives its plausibility from its object—which is not to find out the truth but to get rid of the miraculous. The nineteenth century, it is said, does not believe in miracles. Why reject the incarnation, the works, the resurrection? The reply is, the science of the nineteenth century will not let us admit such things as possible. Universal experience is against them. Law will not admit them. You have only to ask Baden Powell. The vote of the scientific world is that the miracle is impossible. We say no. We summon the scientific world before us. You say gentlemen that the miracle is impossible. On what grounds? "We have never seen one; all things proceed according to established laws." That is good reason for strong improbability. We hold that the miracle is very *improbable*, but we cannot conclude its *impossibility* on such grounds. Is it not *possible* that he who constituted the order of nature should for some purpose arrest that progress? Here our scientific world will divide into two sections, the atheist and impersonal pantheist saying, No, nature is its own author—it never varies—the theist, admitting an abstract possibility. Well then, none but atheists and pantheists of the scientific world will deny the possibility. Their reason is, that there is no God.—But those who have tried to get rid of God as far as possible, making all creation but development, admit that their hypothesis does not account for the formation of the first life germ. God is still necessary for that. But indeed if the doctrine of the conservation or correlation of forces be correct, all the force of creation as developed to this day, was contained in the formation of that first germ. The science of the

present day has corrected that metaphysical philosophy which saw in cause and effect only antecedents and consequents. Faraday, Liebig, Grove and Thompson, all tell us *there is nothing in the effect which was not in the cause.** Well, go back and back and when you have come to the first cause, the originator of the first life germ, you must admit that this is the power which formed all. To form a single life germ may appear a small affair, but to form a life germ which contains in it the cause and power to develop all life germs—behold the almighty God! You have hid him from us, O ye men of science as long as possible, with your development theories, but to make your theories complete you have at last confessed the necessity of God.

"But what then! God has formed all to go on by unchanging law. Can he interfere with the work of his hand?" Certainly, unless you can prove that his force was *exhausted* in the creative act. He would be a bold man who would affirm that. Who will so bind God to his work that he cannot operate upon it, but that he must helplessly let it run on in obedience to Is he greater than God? If so the God of

* The theory of Brown, that all we know of Cause and Effect is that the one invariably follows the other, is generally acquiesced in by the metaphysicians. Thus, J. S. Mill, in his recent examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, says, Vol. 2, page 279, (Boston edition). "What experience makes known is the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some special combination of antecedent conditions in such sort that wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists, the event does not fail to occur. Any *must* in the case, any necessity other than the unconditional universality of the fact we know nothing of."

On the other hand, E. G. J. R. Mayer, in his treatise on the Forces of Inorganic Nature, published in Liebig's Journal, says, "Forces are causes: accordingly we may, in relation to them, make full application of the principle—*Causa æquat Effectum*. If the Cause C has the Effect E, then $C = E$. If, in its turn, C is the Cause of a second Effect F, we have $E = F$, and so on: $C = E = F = C$." He then proceeds to shew that the Cause passes into and is to be found wholly in the Effect, or Effects which oftentimes can be resolved back into their causes. Is there *no must*, *no necessity* here; no knowledge, as Brown would affirm, of anything but sequences? and as Mill continues to say in the teeth of all the scientists?