

framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself — that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons — there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so.

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces — conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach, The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted

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