

might develop dangerously in Germany at the present time. On the one hand there is the revival of militarism, Nazi militarism; and there is the other extreme, the rejection of all defence responsibilities by the Germans and the creation of a power vacuum in the centre of Europe. We know what happens when a vacuum of that kind is created. We have a pretty good idea who would try to move into that vacuum in present circumstances. Nevertheless the fact remains that Germany, as I see it, is bound to become stronger and is bound to become united ultimately. Surely it is better that this should be done in association with the Atlantic powers than in isolation, or on a purely nationalistic basis, or in association with the Communist East which would have no scruples about a Germany armed to the teeth, with Nazi leaders back in harness, provided that was done by a Communist government under Moscow orders.

There are also difficulties in the way of the ratification of these treaties in Paris. There is the financial difficulty facing any French Government; and that was made very clear to us at Lisbon. There is the difficulty of the war in Indo-China, with its inevitable drain on the French economy and on France's human resources. There is the fear, which is still strong and still understandable in France, of a resurgent and remilitarized Germany against which there must be guarantees, which are being worked out. Then also in France today there is a hesitation in certain quarters over the whole European Defence Community concept. But, I think we can be reasonably optimistic that as a result of our Lisbon decision, which makes this progress possible, Germany will be satisfactorily associated with Western defence and in that way with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization before very long.

Another matter with which we dealt at Lisbon is called, and I hate to use this horrible word, the "infrastructure" problem. I disclaim any responsibility for the word. In fact, everyone who speaks about it now disclaims any responsibility for it, but it must have started somewhere. You may be even more shocked when I tell you that once, at Lisbon, we solemnly discussed a subject which was referred to on the agenda as "the solution of the hard core of the third slice of infrastructure." In plain English terms "infrastructure" means collective facilities. We were faced with the problem of deciding how many of these facilities were required for the 1952 programme. It is not much use going ahead with a programme, especially an air programme, if we have not the facilities, such as airfields, with which to carry it out. We were confronted with the problem of finding out how many of these facilities were absolutely necessary in 1952, and how the cost could be fairly divided between member countries. We came to agreement on that point, and the Canadian proportion of that total figure for 1952 for the infrastructure programme appeared in the estimates the other day as \$27 million.

Then finally at Lisbon we completed our consideration of the problem of the association of Greece and Turkey with NATO. The Greek and Turkish representatives took their places there for the first time as full members of the Organization. We began at Lisbon the consideration of the military planning which is required to bring them into the military organization. We agreed that the land forces of these two valuable defence allies would be brought directly under the Supreme Commander of NATO for Europe, and the naval arrangements are to be worked out.