

contribution made by sanctions in South Africa and Serbia, argued that sanctions alone are rarely successful in bringing about policy change. However, in that they are often imposed by governments desperate to "do something," sanctions are almost always successful - in that narrow sense - simply by virtue of their existence. She also suggested that sanctions are rarely designed and implemented in a manner consistent with the task of bringing about *reform* in the target state; rhetoric notwithstanding, sanctions are seen as blunt instruments of direct *control*.

David Malone concurred with the idea that sanctions are often imposed for domestic political reasons. He noted that, while Canadians are typically against the use of military force as an instrument of statecraft, they tend to support the long-term use of sanctions despite the considerable humanitarian impact which such measures entail.

Patrick Martin (Globe and Mail) pointed out that the United States currently has sanctions in effect against 73 states; a fact which serves to discredit even UN-sponsored sanctions. While it might therefore be advisable to temper the use of sanctions, Mr. Martin cautioned that this would be difficult, given their obvious popularity among domestic audiences.

Eric Hoskins (MINA) argued that this appetite for sanctions makes it all the more imperative that we formulate a regime of rules governing the administration of sanctions. Such a regime should encourage actors to weigh the relative costs and benefits of sanctions, paying special attention to their humanitarian implications. While he agreed in principle with these aims, David Malone pointed out that the P-5 are loath to restrict their autonomy to impose and to maintain draconian sanctions on an *ad hoc* basis. As a result, the construction of such a regime would necessarily be a piecemeal, evolutionary process. Nonetheless, Andras Vamos-Goldman (PRMNY) noted that the elected members of the UNSC could have considerable influence over