

cooperation agrees with Hume that experience alone will not account for moral behavior. Without a cooperative disposition we would never make the first move toward cooperation (Bates, 1988; Frank, 1988).

The two accounts differ over the roots of trust. Instead of seeing trust as simply a set of expectations about others' behavior, the second view considers confidence in others a form of "social capital." Social capital is a set of "moral resources" that leads to increased cooperation. On my account, it refers to a society's core values. The more traditional sense of the word--ties to one's community (cf. Putnam, 1993)--I call "social connectedness." Trust depends upon both. But core values are fundamental. *They can lead people to trust each other even when our expectations tell us to be wary.* Ties to one's community are important too. They foster a sense of mutual obligation.

The social capital explanation does not denigrate the role of expectations of others' behavior, but argues that it is insufficient to explain cooperation or moral behavior. There must be something else that prompts people to make the first cooperative move. And this part of social capital is values (cf. Coleman, 1990, 320). As James Q. Wilson (1993, 231) argues: "We are faithful both because we wish others to accept our word and because we consider dishonesty and infidelity to be signs of wickedness." These values are the core elements of social capital and I use the term "social connectedness" to emphasize the set of community ties that Coleman and Putnam consider essential to capital.

Our fundamental beliefs lead us to behave morally even when we might be better off looking out for ourselves. Core values are not contingent. The Ninth Commandment does not say, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor unless (s)he defects first." Our ideals provide guidance for how we should behave *especially in the face of contrary evidence in our environment.*¹

What are the values that constitute social capital? How do they promote cooperation? And where do they come from? I see two values as fundamental: trust in others and religious ideals.² Trust helps us to look beyond our own self-interest and to longer-term stakes. Tocqueville (1945, 122) referred to this "enlightened regard" as "self-interest rightly understood." It leads people to "willingly sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state." Trust provides the glue that binds people together in the absence of enforceable contracts policed by external agents.

Trust as a value is different from trust as a strategic calculation. It is not a statement of unconditional commitment. Trust reflects a fundamentally optimistic view of human nature. Trusters have great confidence that the future will be better than the past and that we can solve most of our pressing problems. Trusters behave morally because they have fundamentally optimistic views of human nature (Deutsch, 1958, 278). Their sanguine expectations makes trusters willing to take greater risks than might be justified by the objective situation. They are more likely to be exploited than distrusters. But optimism will tide them over to the next encounter, where they are likely to trust again because of long-term socialization and a positive outlook on life. They may become more cautious--and demand some verification--if they lose big. But their world involves more than constant updating of information to determine what one's strategy should be for the next encounter (Hardin, 1992, 162, 170). It takes either a lot of small losses or one big one to shake a truster's confidence.