

## Appendix D Suggestions for Future Research

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The following suggestions, made here in the form of a few questions which attempt to sketch the topic, are not necessarily in order of priority. They represent areas for further research which might be pursued.

- What are the “spin-offs” from overhead surveillance and aerial inspection for verification and for environmental monitoring?
  - What effect will declassification of certain U.S. and Former Soviet Union intelligence satellite photos have?
  - What contribution do these spin-offs make to transparency, and what impact will the resulting transparency have on arms control verification?
- Would field trials designed to assess the synergistic effects among space surveillance, aerial inspection, and ground observations be a desirable way to evaluate a verification regime associated with limitations on military forces, including personnel strength?
  - To what degree does the Cloud Gap experience contribute to designing such a field test?
- What are the interrelationships among arms control verification, the confidence-building process, and peace-keeping?
  - What verification synergies are possible?
  - Given the growing trend toward regional and local disarmament and toward peace-keeping, how could these interrelationships contribute to international security?
  - How can the roles of certain international bodies be expanded, coordinated, and optimized to contribute to arms control verification, transparency, and security?
- How could adversarial and coercive multilateral verification regimes and peacekeeping activities be “red-teamed” in order to determine what lessons potential violators learn from these activities?
  - How could these lessons be utilized to modify these verification regimes and peacekeeping activities to minimize their potential benefit to such violators?
- Table 1 in this study summarizes the synergistic effects between verification and confidence-building methods. How could the lessons learned from Table 1 be expanded to include analyses of the optimum use and cost effectiveness of various combinations of these methods for specific agreements?
- Are there verification regimes which could be effective in controlling the application of dual use technologies to weapons programs in the face of political, economic, and technological realities of the post-Cold War period?
- How could the recognition of verification synergies be incorporated into training programs for international inspectors?
  - How could these verification synergies affect the decision to form an international inspectorate and to assist in determining its nature and scope?
- What are the possible, unique contributions which monitoring methods and verification regimes can make to curtailing the proliferation of conventional arms such as surface-to-air missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, light artillery, mortars, automatic infantry weapons, land mines, and associated ammunition?

