

Anomalies must be interpreted before their significance is clear. Given the problems of establishing compliance in a strict sense, and assuming that states attempting diversions would try to confuse the safeguards system, even significant anomalies are likely to present considerable ambiguities. This is why allowing the Agency to report if it cannot verify compliance to its own satisfaction is important: inability to resolve an ambiguous situation may be sufficient to satisfy this condition.

Assessing anomalies is both a technical and a political matter. Technical judgements will be required regarding the qualities of various measurement, counting, data-handling and analytical procedures. The safeguards system must be designed to avoid excessive sensitivity to trivial cases while retaining an ability to spot significant cases. Significant anomalies will be passed to higher levels in the Agency, levels which are more political in their nature. This gradual imbuing of anomalies with political qualities cannot be avoided. What can and should be avoided is any possibility for significant anomalies to be overlooked in the lower levels of an agency. A safeguards system's inspection, reporting, analysis and internal information-management procedures must be designed to avoid such a weakness. The Agency's systems for the detection and handling of anomalies should be studied with this specific problem in mind.

Safeguards Evaluation and Improvement

The Agency has established a system for the evaluation of its safeguards. This system results in the production of a Safeguards Implementation Report, a confidential document. It would be useful to examine in more detail the performance of this evaluation system, the usefulness of the Safeguards Implementation Report, the sorts of problems (particularly recurring problems) and the response of the Agency to deficiencies and difficulties noted in these reports.

Notes

1. Schiff, pp. 106-116.
2. See *ibid.*, pp. 75-76, for a brief discussion of general personnel difficulties in the Agency.
3. Fischer and Szasz, p. 65.
4. Schiff, p. 141.
5. Fischer and Szasz, p. 61.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-97 passim.
8. See footnote 2 above.
9. See Szasz, pp. 607-609, for an explanation of the origins of this practice.
10. Some classes of relevant anomalies are briefly noted in IAEA, *IAEA Safeguards: Implementation at Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities*, IAEA/SG/INF/6, p. 13.
11. The Agency's systems are outlined in *ibid.*
12. Fischer and Szasz, pp. 30-31.